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Local Government Law
by R. Perry Sentell, Jr."
After an attorney's bill of more than $600 for February, the town
council passed a law Tuesday that limits the ability of the mayor and
city clerk to call the attorney. The mayor and clerk were criticized for
contacting the town attorney to answer what one council member
called "useless questions . . . ." The solution was a new town law
requiring that if the mayor, council member, or clerk need to discuss
a town issue with the attorney, the mayor and at least three council
members must approve the question before the call.'

Generally, a little knowledge is a dangerous thing. In local government law, too much knowledge is a fate to be avoided at all costs.
I.

A.

MUNICIPALITIES

Annexation

Under general statute, municipalities possess power to annex
unincorporated "islands" which, on January 1, 1991, were contiguous to
the city and completely surrounded by it.' City of Smyrna v. Adams'
featured municipal employment of that statute to annex two parcels
contiguous to a street allegedly annexed in 1985.' Because the city's

* Carter Professor of Law, University of Georgia School of Law (A.B., 1956; LL.B.,
1958); Harvard University (LL.M., 1961). Member, State Bar of Georgia.
1. An account from R. PERRY SENTELL, JR., LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW: LITE 19 (1997).
For a more serious "profile" of Georgia local government law, those who practice it, and the
practice itself, see PERRY SENTELL, A PROFILE: THE PEOPLE AND PRACTICE OF LOCAL
GOVERNMENT LAW (1994). See also R. Perry Sentell, Jr., Georgia Local Government Law:
A Reflection on Thirty Surveys, 46 MERCER L. REV. 1 (1994).
2. O.C.G.A. § 36-36-92 (1995).
3. 255 Ga. App. 453, 565 S.E.2d 606 (2002).
4. Id. at 453, 565 S.E.2d at 607. "If the street was not within the city limits on or
before January 1, 1991, then the two parcels did not abut city property on or before
January 1, 1991, and the purported annexations in 2000 and 2001 are null and void." Id.
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evidence failed to substantiate the 1985 effort, however, the court of
appeals invalidated the "island" annexations.' Of city council minutes
showing that in 1985 the Department of Transportation approved the
street's annexation, the court observed that "[t]he DOT... does not have
the authority to give away state land."6 The 1985 annexation having
failed, the court concluded, the subject street could not supply the
necessary contiguity for the later island annexations.7
Although typically deemed a municipal procedure, annexation
inevitably impacts the county as well, a point graphically illustrated by
Coweta County v. City of Senoia.s The case presented a pre-annexation
agreement between the governments, one "mitigative measure"9 being
that "'[a]ll lots developed along the common boundary of the City and
County shall have a minimum lot size of 1.6 acres ... ,"10 When the
municipality's subsequent annexation plat showed a fifty-foot buffer
along the city-county boundary,1 the county charged violation of the
agreement and sought injunctive relief.'2 Focusing upon "the actual
language of the mitigative measure," 3 the supreme court noted its
applicability to all lots developed on the boundary. 4 The buffer "is not
a lot,"15 the court reasoned, and "can never be developed."16 Accordingly, "[i]f there are no developed lots on the boundary, it follows that

5. Id. at 455, 565 S.E.2d at 608. "[Clontemporaneous city council minutes show that
the council acted on the presumed authority of the DOT as owner of the street, held a
public hearing, and then passed a motion to annex the street." Id. at 454, 565 S.E.2d at
608.
6. Id. at 454, 565 S.E.2d at 608. Rather, "'[t]he power to dispose of property belonging
to the State is vested in the legislature.'" Id. (quoting W. Union Tel. Co. v. W. & Atl. R.R.,
142 Ga. 532, 534, 83 S.E. 135 (1914)).
7. Id. at 455, 565 S.E.2d at 608. "The plaintiffs also had standing to bring suit, not
only because the Code specifically allows them to sue, but also because if the city annexed
their property, they would be obligated to pay city taxes." Id.
8. 275 Ga. 707, 573 S.E.2d 21 (2002).
9. Id. at 708, 573 S.E.2d at 22.
10. Id. (citation omitted). The agreement was part of the dispute resolution process for
annexations, provided by O.C.G.A. section 36-70-24 (1995). Id. at 707, 573 S.E.2d at 22.
11. The municipality submitted the plat pursuant to the agreement as well. Id. at 707,
573 S.E.2d at 22.
12. Id. "The County contends on appeal that since the buffer is not a lot, it cannot be
considered to comply with the mitigative measure." Id. at 708, 573 S.E.2d at 22.
13. Id. at 708, 573 S.E.2d at 22.
14. Id., 573 S.E.2d at 23.
15. Id.
16. Id.
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there are no lots to which the mitigative measure would apply,"17 and
the municipality had complied with the agreement."8
B.

Officers and Employees

The court of appeals resolved several issues touching upon assorted
rights of municipal officers and employees. The typically included issue
of workers' compensation 9 found representation in Pitts v. City of
Rome,2 ° in which there was a benefits claim for a police major's jobrelated stroke. 21 Emphasizing both the State Board's denial of the
22
claim and its own relegation to the "any evidence" standard of review,
a majority of the court carefully canvassed the conflicting evidence
linking stress to the officer's stroke. 23 The administrative law judge
found "'only a possibility that this stress contributed to the onset of the
and "the evidence supported the factstroke,'" 24 the court recounted,
25
finder's determination."

17. Id.
18. Id. at 709, 573 S.E.2d at 23. The court thus affirmed the trial court's judgment in
For additional perspective on the Georgia law of
favor of the municipality. Id.
annexation, see R. Perry Sentell, Jr., The Law of Municipal Annexation in Georgia:
Evolution of a Concept?, 2 GA. L. REV. 35 (1967); R. Perry Sentell, Jr., Municipal
Annexation in Georgia:Nay-Sayers Beware, 5 GA. L. REV. 499 (1971); R. Perry Sentell, Jr.,
Municipal Annexation in Georgia:The Contiguity Conundrum, 9 GA. L. REV. 167 (1974);
R. Perry Sentell, Jr., Municipal De-Annexation: The Ins and the Outs, 27 GA. ST. B.J. 118
(1991).
19. For perspective, see R. Perry Sentell, Jr., Workers' Compensation in Georgia
Municipal Law, 15 GA. L. REV. 57 (1980).
20. 256 Ga. App. 278, 568 S.E.2d 167 (2002).
21. Id. at 281, 568 S.E.2d at 169. The major had worked for the municipality for thirtyone years and had various responsibilities including, most recently, the supervision of the
construction of a firing range and public safety building. Id. at 278-79, 568 S.E.2d at 168.
22. The evidence must be construed "'in a light most favorable to the party prevailing
before the board,'" the court observed, and the fact finder's determination must be
sustained if any evidence supported it. Id. at 278, 568 S.E.2d 168 (citing Sutton v. B & L
Express, 215 Ga. App. 394, 450 S.E.2d 859 (1994)).
23. Id. at 281, 568 S.E.2d at 169. The claimant's doctor "cited work-related stress as
a contributing factor," but the municipality countered with doctors who "found no basis for
such a causal link and testified that tying stress to the stroke would be mere speculation."
Id.
24. Id. at 280, 568 S.E.2d at 169. "Finding that [claimant] did not sufficiently prove
her claim, the AI.J denied the requested benefits. The appellate division adopted the ALJ's
conclusions, and the superior court affirmed that decision." Id.
25. Id. at 281, 568 S.E.2d at 169. "And once the trier of fact locates and draws that
line, we are required to affirm if any evidence supports the factfinder's determination." Id.
at 280, S.E.2d at 169. A dissenting opinion for two judges argued that "the AILJ's
statement in this case that work duties must be the primary cause of the stress that
contributed to the injury is clearly incorrect." Id. at 281-83, 568 S.E.2d at 170 (Barnes, J.,
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Employee compensation drew the court's attention in City of Atlanta
v. Miller;26 specifically, the court addressed the issue of the number of
27
hours firefighters must work to qualify for "emergency compensation."
Unlike other employees, "firefighters work[ed] 24/48 work shifts, i.e., 24
hours on duty followed by 48 hours off duty."28 Under an ordinance
requiring emergency compensation for employees temporarily serving in
higher positions for more than thirty work days,29 the municipality
counted one twenty-four-hour shift for firefighters as only two eight-hour
days. Under that interpretation, firefighters must serve forty-five days
(rather than thirty) to become eligible for the higher pay. ° Rejecting
the city's position, 3 ' the court found nothing in the ordinance to suggest
"that the lawmakers intended that firefighters should be required to
work more hours than other City employees" 3 2 to receive emergency
compensation."
Georgia statutory law affords peace officers a number of rights,
including the right of prosecution only upon grand jury indictment.34
In State v.Lockett," a municipal police officer claimed that right to

dissenting).
26. 256 Ga. App. 819, 569 S.E.2d 907 (2002).
27. Id. at 821-22, 569 S.E.2d at 910. I.e., compensation temporarily received "'[ulpon
an employee being required to perform the duties of a higher classified position for a period
of time in excess of [thirty] work days.'" Id. at 820, 569 S.E.2d at 909 (quoting ATLANTA
CITY CODE § 114-134 (1995)).
28. Id. at 820, 569 S.E.2d at 909.
29. ATLANTA CODE § 114-134 (1995).
30. 256 Ga. App. at 821, 569 S.E.2d at 909. "Under the City's interpretation, a
firefighter must work at the higher classified position for 15 consecutive shifts, or 45 days,
before becoming eligible for the higher pay." Id.
31. Id. "The City's argument for treating firefighters differently consists of merely
restating the policy without elucidating a basis for it." Id.
32. Id. at 822, 569 S.E.2d at 910.
33. Id. "We find nothing in the record or in the City's ordinances that justifies treating
firefighters differently from other city workers." Id. at 821, 569 S.E.2d at 909.
In City of Atlanta v. Lane, 276 Ga. 339, 578 S.E.2d 420 (2003), the supreme court focused
exclusively upon the city code to invalidate the city's retroactive suspension and dismissal
of a police officer based on the officer's pleading guilty to federal crimes. Id. at 339, 578
S.E.2d at 420. Because the city had not appealed the civil service board's reversal of its
previous dismissal of the officer for work violations unrelated to the federal crimes, the city
must, under its own code, physically rehire the officer as an employee administratively
(though state statute prevented a felon from serving as a police officer) for the purpose of
calculating his back compensation up to the time he could have been lawfully dismissed
for the federal crimes. Id.
34. See O.C.G.A. § 17-7-52 (1997 & Supp. 2002); O.C.G.A. § 45-11-4 (2002). Dudley v.
State, 273 Ga. 466, 542 S.E.2d 99 (2001). See generally R. Perry Sentell, Jr. Georgia Local
Government Officials and the Grand Jury, 26 GA. ST. B.J. 50 (1989).
35. 259 Ga. App. 179, 576 S.E.2d 582 (2003).
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quash an accusation charging the misdemeanor offenses of "speeding and
driving too fast for conditions." 3' Rejecting a state argument that the
grand jury procedure existed only for "public officers,"37 the court held
that "peace officers" are entitled to the same protections.3 8 "Clearly,
through the enactment of [the peace officers statute], the legislature
intended to grant to 'peace officers,' who are empowered to perform
various law enforcement functions, the protections afforded to 'public
officers' under [the public officers statute]."39 Consequently, the court
affirmed the trial judge's actions in quashing the accusation.4 °
C.

Regulation

In City of Decatur v. DeKalb County,41 the "dispositive issue [was]
whether a county government [was] exempt from all municipal
regulation of construction projects undertaken by the county with respect
to county-owned property located within the city and used for governmental purposes."42 Specifically, the county "accepted a bid from a
contractor to commence construction on the courthouse before obtaining
permits from [the city] and further did not apply for city permits relating

36. Id. at 179, 576 S.E.2d at 583. The officer presented evidence that he was on duty
when the incident occurred, and the state presented no evidence to the contrary. Id.
"[Tihe state chose to file an accusation charging [the officer] with the commission of
misdemeanors under [O.C.G.A. sections] 40-6-181 and 40-6-180." Id. at 181, 576 S.E.2d at
584.
37. "The state contends that the right to grand jury presentment applies only to the
offenses enumerated in [O.C.G.A. section] 45-11-4(b), which include malpractice,
misfeasance, or malfeasance in office, and other offenses not relevant here." Id. at 180, 576
S.E.2d at 584.
38. Id. "[W]e conclude that the legislature did not intend to limit the application of
[O.C.G.A. section] 17-7-52 to the offenses enumerated in [O.C.G.A. section] 45-11-4(b)." Id.
39. Id. The court explained that "'all statutes relating to the same subject-matter,
briefly called statutes in pari materia, are construed together, and harmonized wherever
possible, so as to ascertain the legislative intendment and give effect thereto.'" Id. (quoting
Lawson v. State, 224 Ga. App. 645, 647, 481 S.E.2d 856 (1997)). See generally R. PERRY
SENTELL, JR., STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION IN GEORGIA: STATUTES IN PARI MATERIA (1996).
40. 259 Ga. App. at 181, 576 S.E.2d at 585. "Because the state failed to present the
matter to a grand jury for indictment as required by [O.C.G.A. section] 17-7-52, we affirm
[the trial court's order quashing the accusation]." Id. at 179, 576 S.E.2d at 583.
41. 256 Ga. App. 46, 567 S.E.2d 376 (2002).
42. Id. at 46, 567 S.E.2d at 377. For treatment of municipal regulatory powers in an
assortment of litigated contexts, see R. Perry Sentell, Jr., "AscertainableStandards"versus
'Unbridled Discretion" in Local Government Regulation, 41 GA. COUNTY GOV'T MAG. 19
(Dec. 1989); R. Perry Sentell, Jr., Discretion in Georgia Local Government Law, 8 GA. L.
REV. 614 (1974); R. Perry Sentell, Jr., Local Government Law and Liquor Licensing: A

Sobering Vignette, 15 GA. L. REV. 1039 (1981); R. Perry Sentell, Jr., Reasoning by Riddle:
The Power to Prohibit in Georgia Local Government Law, 9 GA. L. REV. 115 (1974).
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[clounty government building."43
Reversing the trial judge's decision for the county," the court of
appeals held that, aside from zoning regulations,4 5 "county government
building projects ... are subject to other municipal regulation[s] (as
indicated by the Georgia Legislature)."4" Relying upon both the
constitution4 7 and general statutes,8 the court instanced fire safety
matters and land-disturbing activities as two areas "where the legislature has expressed an intent for municipalities to have some authority
to regulate the building activities associated with county construction
within [municipal] boundaries."4 9
Regulation in the guise of taxation doomed the "occupation tax"
ordinance challenged in City of Atlanta v. Barnes.5 ° The litigated
measure imposed an annual levy on attorneys practicing in the
municipality,51 a levy the supreme court denominated a "precondition
on the practice of law."52 Emphasizing the ordinance's requirement of
payment "in advance of practicing law,""5 as well as its penalty of
incarceration for nonpayment, the court viewed the measure as one
"imped[ing] the practice of law."54 Those features rendered the
to renovations

on another

...

43. 256 Ga. App. at 46-47, 567 S.E.2d at 377. The county sought a declaratory
judgment and a permanent injunction "forbidding [the municipality] from enforcing its
zoning, building, and other ordinances with respect to the construction of the... [c]ounty
courthouse and other county government building projects conducted within ... city
limits." Id. at 46, 567 S.E.2d at 377.
44. Id. at 46, 567 S.E.2d at 377. "[W]e reverse the trial court's order to the extent that
it exempts the county from all municipal building regulations beyond zoning regulations."

Id.
45. Id. For discussion of this portion of the court's decision, see infra text accompanying note 43.
46. 256 Ga. App. at 46, 567 S.E.2d at 377. ' [Z]oning is to be distinguished from other
regulations with which a developer must comply, such as requirements for a building
permit. Each type of regulation is independent of the other and seeks to accomplish its
purpose by a different means.'" Id. at 48, 567 S.E.2d at 378 (quoting Fairfax MK, Inc. v.
City of Clarkston, 274 Ga. 520, 521, 555 S.E.2d 722 (2001)).
47. GA. CONST. art. IX, § 2, para. 3(a).
48. O.C.G.A. § 12-7-1 to -18 (2001 & Supp. 2002).
49. 256 Ga. App. at 49, 567 S.E.2d at 379. The court observed that '[tihrough more
cooperative efforts, the counties and cities may in the future be able to avoid the very types
of lawsuits generated by the events of this case." Id. at 50, 567 S.E.2d at 379.
50. 276 Ga. 449, 578 S.E.2d 110 (2003).
51. Id. at 449, 578 S.E.2d at 111-12. Plaintiff attorneys had demanded a refund for
taxes paid in past years and, receiving no action by the city for a year, then challenged the
constitutionality of the ordinance under authority of O.C.G.A. section 48-5-380(c) (1999).

Id.
52.
53.
54.

Id., 578 S.E.2d at 112.
Id. at 450, 578 S.E.2d at 112.
Id.
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ordinance "an unconstitutional regulation of the practice of law,"55 a
6
function "which is reserved by Georgia's constitution to this Court."
5
7
Rejecting the city's arguments of severability and prospective invalidity,58 the court proceeded to overrule a prior decision "that there can be
no class actions brought for tax refunds."59 Accordingly, the court
affirmed the trial judge's class certification for plaintiffs claiming
municipal tax refunds. 60
D. Finances
The survey period confronted the Georgia Supreme Court with a novel
issue arising under the Joint County and Municipal Sales and Use Tax
Act.61 In Wells v. City of Baldwin,62 the court reviewed a tax "roll
back" ordinance adopted by a municipality lying partly in two counties,
one of which imposed a local option sales tax." Under the ordinance,
the municipality used the sales tax proceeds from the taxing county to

55.

Id.

56. Id. For its rationale and decision, the court adopted its prior decision in Sexton v.
City of Jonesboro, 267 Ga. 571, 481 S.E.2d 818 (1997).
This Court made clear in Sexton that municipalities may impose an occupation tax
that includes lawyers within its scope so long as the tax is a revenue measure only
and does not act effectively as a precondition or license for engaging in the
practice of law .... [Tihis Court enumerated a number of elements showing the
true nature of the tax ordinance ....
Id.

57. Id. at 451, 578 S.E.2d at 112-13. "The requirement that the tax be paid prior to
practicing law in [the city] could not be severed without radically rewriting the ordinance,
which is not a judicial function." Id.
58. Id. at 453, 578 S.E.2d at 114. The court reasoned that the city had been aware of
its prior decision (Sexton) invalidating such measures and could have chosen "atax scheme
that did not act as a precondition to the practice of law" but did not, and that the city "has
had the use of the money it collected under the occupation tax ordinance and the lawyers
from whom it was collected have lost that use." Id. Thus, the court was "not persuaded
that justice require[d] prospective application." Id.
59. Id. at 452, 578 S.E.2d at 113 (citing Henderson v. Carter, 229 Ga. 876, 195 S.E.2d
4 (1972)). "We conclude, therefore, that the holding in Henderson that there can be no
class actions brought for tax refunds was error and that Henderson must be overruled .
.. Id.

60. Id. at 454, 578 S.E.2d at 115. "Since .. .we have overruled Henderson, no basis
for reversal of the trial court ruling on that issue appears." Id. at 452, 578 S.E.2d at 113.
61. O.C.G.A. §§ 48-8-80 to -95 (2002). "The Act created 159 special districts within the
State, with the geographical boundary of each county corresponding to and coterminous
with the geographical boundary of one of the 159 special districts." Wells v. City of
Baldwin, 275 Ga. 228, 229, 565 S.E.2d 439, 440 (2002).
62. 275 Ga. 228, 565 S.E.2d 439 (2002).
63. Id. at 228, 565 S.E.2d at 439.
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reduce the millage rate for all city residents in both counties.' On the
complaint of city residents in the taxing county, a unanimous supreme
court held the tax statute's "plain language" to invalidate the municipal
ordinance.6 5 Indeed, "[1l]anguage throughout the Act reflect[ed] the
Legislature's understanding that there are municipalities which are
located only 'partially' within special districts in the State."" That
understanding, the court perceived, "limits the application of the rollback
provision.., to those residents of the special district [county] where the
tax is imposed.... . 6 7 In reaching its conclusion, the court rejected the
municipality's argument that a rollback in only a part of the city would
violate the "uniformity" requirement of the Georgia Constitution.6 8
Rather, the constitution's authorization of the sales tax statute
"specifically provides for the levy of taxes to pay the cost of providing
69
services within the limited territory of the special district."

E. Liability
Municipal liability remained a litigated subject of high profile during
the survey period, with that litigation touching various facets of
governmental responsibility.7 ° Focusing upon the nature of the harm,
Canberg v. City of Toccoa71 featured claims for emotional distress
allegedly suffered when municipal firefighters refused to suppress a fire
which consumed the plaintiffs' home.72 As for the claim of negligent
64. Id., 565 S.E.2d at 440.
65. Id. at 229, 565 S.E.2d at 440.
66. Id. at 230, 565 S.E.2d at 441. The court noted O.C.G.A. section 48-8-89.3, providing
l
that "'[f or the purpose of all population based calculations under this Code section, only
that portion of the population of a qualified municipality which is located within the special
district shall be computed.'" Id. (quoting O.C.G.A. § 48-8-89.3(d) (2002)).
67. Id. at 229, 565 S.E.2d at 440.
68. Id. at 230-31, 565 S.E.2d at 441; GA. CONST. art. VII, § 1, para. 3(a).
69. 275 Ga. at 231, 565 S.E.2d at 441; GA. CONST. art. IX, § 2, para. 6. Article IX,
section two, paragraph 6 of the Georgia Constitution "requires that taxes levied and
collected within a special district be used to pay the cost of providing local government
services within that district." 275 Ga. at 231, 565 S.E.2d at 441. The court thus reversed
the trial court's decision upholding the validity of the challenged municipal ordinance. Id.,
565 S.E.2d 442.
70. For perspective and a general chronology, see R. PERRY SENTELL, JR., THE LAW OF
MUNiCIPAL TORT LIABILITY IN GEORGIA (4th ed. 1988); R. Perry Sentell, Jr., Georgia Local

Government Tort Liability: The "Crisis"Conundrum, 2 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 19 (1985); R.
Perry Sentell, Jr., Local Government Tort Liability: The Summer of '92, 9 GA. ST. U. L.
REV. 405 (1993).
71. 255 Ga. App. 890, 567 S.E.2d 21 (2002).
72. Id. at 890, 567 S.E.2d at 22. The firefighters contended that plaintiffs' home was
not within the city limits and discounted their possession of a city garbage can with the
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infliction, the court of appeals affirmed the trial judge's summary
judgment for the city.73 Although plaintiffs had alleged physical impact
and resulting physical injuries, they did not "claim that their physical
injuries caused their mental suffering or emotional distress." 4 On the
contrary, the court did find a jury issue regarding plaintiffs' claim of
intentional infliction. 7' Refusal to fight the fire and charging plaintiffs
with attempting to defraud the city76 might be found "'sufficiently
outrageous and egregious to support
an award of damages for intentional
77
infliction of emotional distress.'
Municipal response to an injunction sharply divided the supreme court
in City of Roswell v. Eller Media Co.,78 in which the issue was the city's
alleged violation of an order to permit a company's construction and
operation of advertising signs.7 9 A majority of the court reviewed the
litigation producing the order as well as the municipality's subsequent
conduct."0 "The record demonstrates ... that after the signs were
constructed, the Mayor, using extensive City resources and personnel,
contacted every business or organization that displayed a message or
advertised on [the company's] signs in the City ... and strongly
discouraged them from advertising on such signs.""1 Accordingly, the

response that anyone could procure such a container "to try to convince people that the
house was inside the city limits." Id. at 891, 567 S.E.2d at 22.
73. Id. at 890, 567 S.E.2d at 22.
74. Id. at 891, 567 S.E.2d at 23. "Georgia's current impact rule has three elements: (1)
a physical impact to the plaintiff; (2) the physical impact causes physical injury to the
plaintiff; and (3) the physical injury to the plaintiff causes the plaintiffs mental suffering
or emotional distress." Id.
75. Id. at 892, 567 S.E.2d at 23.
76. Id. The court reasoned that the firefighters "essentially accused the [plaintiffs] of
attempting to defraud the City by taking a city garbage can and placing it in their
driveway .... " Id.
77. Id. (quoting S & W Seafoods Co. v. Jacor Broad. of Atlanta, 194 Ga. App. 233, 236,
390 S.E.2d 228, 231 (1990)). Consequently, the court reversed the trial judge's grant of
summary judgment to the city on the charge of intentional infliction. Id. at 892-93, 567
S.E.2d at 23.
78. 275 Ga. 379, 566 S.E.2d 659 (2002).
79. Id. at 379, 566 S.E.2d at 659-60.
80. Id., 566 S.E.2d at 659.
The injunction at issue arose out of contentious litigation in which the City sought
to preclude [defendant company] from constructing and operating advertising
signs within the City .... Ultimately, the trial court ruled in favor of [defendant
company] and entered its order directing [the mayor] and the City to 'permit [the
company] to construct and operate each and every sign' involved in the action.
Id.
81. Id., 566 S.E.2d at 659-60. "In response to the Mayor's numerous threats and
actions, several businesses canceled their contracts to advertise on [the company's] signs."
Id., 566 S.E.2d at 660.
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court found no abuse of discretion in the trial judge's conclusion of
contempt.8 2 Additionally, the court rejected defendants' claim of First
Amendment protection: "There is no constitutional protection for the
Mayor's acts not involving speech or for his use of explicit and implicit
threats of official sanctions and economic reprisals against those who
contracted with [the company]." 3
A difference of opinion also surfaced in the court of appeals, its
disagreement arising over the reach of Georgia's statute declaring
municipal liability (to the extent of insurance) for injuries caused by
high-speed chases. 4 The statute's coverage is limited to injury
resulting from a suspect's fleeing from a municipal officer who "acted
with reckless disregard for proper law enforcement procedures in the
officer's decision to initiate or continue the pursuit." 5 In City of

82. Id. at 380, 566 S.E.2d at 660. The court emphasized that "[a] trial court has wide
discretion in determining whether its orders have been violated and such determination
will not be disturbed absent a gross abuse of discretion." Id. at 379, 566 S.E.2d at 660.
83. Id. at 380, 566 S.E.2d at 660. "The trial court found that appellants engaged in a
'course of conduct,' including the use of threats, the clear intent of which was to interfere
with and impede the operation of [the company's] signs." Id.
A forceful dissenting opinion of three justices argued that the contempt action arose "not
from actions taken under any city ordinance to prohibit [the company] from constructing
and operating the signs, but from separate and distinct actions taken by the mayor to
contact advertisers and discourage them from advertising in the city." Id. at 381, 566
S.E.2d at 661 (Sears, P.J., dissenting). This conduct, the dissent urged, "simply is not
prohibited by and exceeds the scope of the trial court's judgment involving the litigation
over the city ordinances.. . ." Id. The dissent further maintained that the contempt order
violated the First Amendment rights of the mayor and municipality. Id.
84. City of Winder v. McDougald, 254 Ga. App. 537, 562 S.E.2d 826 (2002); O.C.G.A.
§ 40-6-6(d)(2) (2001 & Supp. 2002). For discussion of the motor vehicle insurance statute,
see R. Perry Sentell, Jr., Tort Liability Insurance in Georgia Local Government Law, 24
MERCER L. REV. 651 (1973).
Another instance of statutory liability exists for the municipality's negligence in
maintaining its streets and sidewalks if it has actual or constructive knowledge of the
defect in time to repair or provide warning. O.C.G.A. § 32-4-93(a) (2001). The survey
period case of English v. City of Macon, 259 Ga. App. 766, 577 S.E.2d 837 (2003) presented
an action under that statute. In English the plaintiff allegedly fell on the sidewalk due to
uneven surfaces caused by recent city repairs. Reversing a judgment for the city on
grounds of insufficient knowledge, the court of appeals reasoned that "the pleadings [were]
sufficient to raise the inference that the City, having 'repaired' the sidewalk, had implied
knowledge of the defect therein. 'The City failed to meet its burden on summary judgment
to negate such inference.'" Id. at 768, 577 S.E.2d at 839 (quoting Godinho v. City of Tybee
Island, 231 Ga. App. 377, 380, 499 S.E.2d 389, 392 (1998)).
85. O.C.G.A. § 40-6-6(d)(2) (2001). The statute provides that
the law enforcement officer's pursuit shall not be the proximate cause or a
contributing proximate cause of the damage, injury, or death caused by the fleeing
suspect unless the law enforcement officer acted with reckless disregard for proper
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Winder v. McDougald,"6 a majority of the court applied the statute to
an action by parents of an unlicensed underage driver killed while
fleeing a city police officer.87 Denying the municipality's motion for
summary judgment, the court relied upon evidence that the officer
disregarded a fellow officer's instructions to end the pursuit after the
minor "recklessly drove past parked cars and started driving [seventy
miles per hour] on the wrong side of the road." 8 In a vigorous dissent,
two judges read the statutory duty as limited to injuries received by
innocent third persons.89 Otherwise, the dissent reasoned, the statute
would "stand for the absurd proposition that a pursuing officer may be
held liable as 'the proximate cause' of a fleeing suspect's injury or death
when the injury or death was 'caused by the fleeing suspect."'9 °
A concern over decedent's own conduct likewise influenced the court's
disposition in Spooner v. City of Camilla,91 a wrongful death action for

law enforcement procedures in the officer's decision to initiate or continue the
pursuit.

Id.
86. 254 Ga. App. 537, 562 S.E.2d 826 (2002).
87. Id. at 539-40, 562 S.E.2d 828. The fourteen-year-old minor had sneaked out of her
home at 3:00 a.m. and taken her parents' car without permission. When the officer
attempted to stop her for driving without lights, she accelerated, sped through a parking
lot where she damaged her parents' car, and drove on the wrong side of the road at speeds
over seventy miles per hour. She sped through a curve and crashed into a utility pole. Id.
at 537-38, 562 S.E.2d at 827.
88. Id. at 540, 562 S.E.2d at 828. "The [parents] therefore presented some evidence
that the pursuing officer acted with reckless disregard for proper police procedures, and
the trial court properly denied [the city's] motion for summary judgment." Id.
89. Id. at 540-41, 562 S.E.2d at 829 (Andrews, P.J., dissenting). "Georgia's appellate
courts have not previously addressed such a claim by a fleeing violator for damages
suffered during unlawful flight from an identified police pursuer." Id. at 541, 562 S.E.2d
at 829 (Andrews, P.J., dissenting).
90. Id. at 542, 562 S.E.2d at 830 (Andrews, P.J., dissenting): "To impose this duty
would discourage police officers from pursuing the violators and encourage flight, thereby
leaving potentially dangerous drivers on the road. It would also reward fleeing violators
with causes of action for damages flowing from their own wrongdoing." Id. at 543, 562
S.E.2d at 830.
The dissent proved prescient, for the Georgia Supreme Court granted certiorari and,
after the cut-off date for the survey period, reversed. City of Winder v. McDonald, No.
50261156, 2003 Ga. LEXIS 616 (Ga. July 11, 2003). The "reckless disregard" pursuit
statute, a majority of the court established, applies only to the claims of innocent parties.
Id. at *2. A dissenting opinion of two justices protested the majority's distinction, in
applying the statute, between innocent third parties and fleeing suspects. Id. at *3
(Benham, J., dissenting).
91. 256 Ga. App. 179, 568 S.E.2d 109 (2002).
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a thirteen-year-old minor who drowned in a city-owned pit.92 As for
negligence liability, the court reasoned that "the undisputed evidence
shows that [decedent] knew the pit was filled with water and that he
could not swim, yet he chose to jump into the water."9" Consequently,
the court asserted, he "assumed the risk as a matter of law."94 As to
plaintiff's claim for nuisance, the court responded that "landowners are
permitted to maintain ponds-either natural or artificial-on their
property without erecting fences or barricades."9" Here, the city had
not "failed to act within a reasonable time after knowledge of the defect
or dangerous condition."96 On both counts, therefore, the court affirmed
the municipality's summary judgment.9"
The nuisance contention also confronted the court in City of Gainesville v. Waters,9" in which homeowners sued for municipal failure to
maintain its drainage system.99
Reviewing evidence of a buried
municipal pipe which caused repeated flooding and septic-tank backup
during a period from 1993 to 1995,100 the court upheld plaintiffs'
showing of an "abatable nuisance."101 Moreover, every continuance

92. Id. at 179, 181, 568 S.E.2d at 110, 111. The city owned some thirty acres of land
for industrial development from which it excavated dirt for building projects thereby
creating the pit that filled with water. Id. at 179, 568 S.E.2d at 110.
93. Id. at 181, 568 S.E.2d at 111. The court found that the child "was capable of
appreciating the risks associated with jumping into water, especially after having been told
that very day that he could not go to the pool because he could not swim." Id. at 182, 568
S.E.2d at 112.
94. Id. at 183, 568 S.E.2d at 112. The court enumerated the requirements of
assumption of risk as actual knowledge, appreciation of the danger, and voluntary
exposure. Id. at 181, 568 S.E.2d at 111. "[Alssumption of the risk," the court concluded,
"serves as a complete defense to a claim of negligence." Id. at 183, 568 S.E.2d at 112.
95. Id. at 184, 568 S.E.2d at 113.
96. Id. at 183, 568 S.E.2d at 113. The court enumerated the three necessary
conditions for a municipal nuisance: more than mere negligence, continuous or regularly
repetitious conduct, and failure to act within a reasonable time after knowledge. Id. For
treatment of nuisance liability in Georgia local government law, see R. PERRY SENTELL, JR.,
THE LAW OF MuNIcIPAL TORT LIABILITY IN GEORGIA 117-34 (1988); R. Perry Sentell, Jr.,
Georgia County Liability: Nuisance or Not?, 43 MERCER L. REV. 1 (1991); R. Perry Sentell,
Jr., Municipal Liability in 'eorgia: The "Nuisance"Nuisance, 12 GA. ST. B.J. 11 (1975).
97. 256 Ga. App. at 184, 568 S.E.2d at 113.
98. 258 Ga. App. 555, 574 S.E.2d 638 (2002).
99. Id. at 555, 574 S.E.2d at 641.
100. Id. at 556, 574 S.E.2d at 641-42. "The expert further testified that the problem
is caused by a buried 15-inch pipe that crosses under [plaintiffs'] street and ends in
[plaintiffs'] yard. He concluded that the water comes 'out of the 15-inch pipe and out of the
ground and across the ground and then into the end of the drain field.'" Id.
101. Id. at 557, 574 S.E.2d at 642. "'Where a municipality negligently constructs or
undertakes to maintain a sewer or drainage system which causes the repeatedflooding of
property, a continuing, abatable nuisance is established, for which the municipality is lia-
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afforded a fresh cause of action, the court held, and the only claims
barred were those suffered more than four years prior to plaintiffs'
10 3
action. 102 In addition to approving damages and injunctive relief,
the court also found evidence of the "bad faith" necessary for an award
of attorney fees:10 4 "[Tihere was some evidence that, despite [plaintiffs'] numerous complaints and its knowledge that [plaintiffs'] property
flooded as a result of its failure to act, the City refused to alleviate the
drainage problems."' 5
The continuing nature of the harm also impacted a dispute over the
historic ante litem notice mandate,0 6 the statutory requirement that
prior to filing money damage actions against municipalities, claimants
must provide written notice within six months of the incident.' 7
Plaintiffs in City of Forsyth v. Bell'0° alleged their negligent exposure
to lead paint and asbestos in working on a city building in 1997,109

that they discovered the danger in January 2000, and that they notified
the city in April 2000.10 Rejecting municipal reliance upon untimely
notice, the court asserted that failure to warn of injury "due to continued
exposure constitutes a continuing tort.""' It was sufficient, the court
held, that plaintiffs provided the city with notice of their claim "within
ble.'" Id. (quoting Hibbs v. City of Riverdale, 267 Ga. 337, 338, 478 S.E.2d 121, 122
(1996)). The court emphasized that its review of the trial court's actions in denying the
city's motion for directed verdict or j.n.o.v. was governed by the "any evidence" standard
of appellate review. Id. at 556, 574 S.E.2d at 642.
102. Id. at 558, 574 S.E.2d at 643. "Because [plaintiffs] filed this action in April 1998,
the only claims barred are those suffered more than four years before that date." Id.
103. Id. at 562, 574 S.E.2d at 645. "When a continuing nuisance is found, a property
owner may obtain both damages and an injunction." Id.
104. Id. at 559-60, 574 S.E.2d at 643-44. Said the court: "[O.C.G.A. section] 13-6-11
allows recovery of attorney fees if the defendant has acted in bad faith, has been stubbornly
litigious, or has caused the plaintiff unnecessary trouble and expense." Id.
105. Id. at 560, 574 S.E.2d at 644.
106. O.C.G.A. § 36-33-5(b) (2000 & Supp. 2002).
107. Id. For perspective on the ante litem notice requirement, and its application in
the cases, see R. PERRY SENTELL, JR., THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL TORT LIABILITY IN GEORGIA
145-74 (1988); R. Perry Sentell, Jr., Georgia Municipal Tort Liability: Ante Litem Notice,
4 GA. L. REV. 134 (1969); R. Perry Sentell, Jr., Ante Litem Notice: Cause for Pause, URBAN
GA. MAG. 24 (Oct. 1978).
108. 258 Ga. App. 331, 574 S.E.2d 331 (2002).
109. Id. at 332, 574 S.E.2d at 332. Plaintiffs were prison inmates assigned to a work
detail which gutted the interior of a building for the city and hauled the debris to a landfill.
Id. at 331-32, 574 S.E.2d at 331-32.
110. Id. at 332, 574 S.E.2d at 332. Plaintiffs alleged that the exposure put them at risk
for developing lung cancer and other related diseases, and that the city knew of the danger
and failed to warn them. Id. at 331-32, 574 S.E.2d at 331-32.
111. Id. at 332, 574 S.E.2d at 332. The court reasoned that the ante litem requirement
is a statute of limitations and that it constitutes a prerequisite to a suit. Id.
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six months after discovering their exposure to the hazard of which they
complain."" 2
The notice defense fared markedly better in Conley v. Dawson,"3 an
action against a municipal police officer in both his official and
individual capacities." 4 Plaintiff charged the officer's "conspiracy"
with parties to an automobile accident in which plaintiff's child was
killed." 5 On grounds that an action against the officer in his official
capacity constituted in reality an action against the municipality itself,
the court declared the claim simply "not sustainable without the ante
litem notice.""'
As for plaintiff's claim against the officer individually, the court
promptly invoked the concept of "official immunity," constitutionally
conferred upon public agents for discretionary actions without actual
malice." 7
Plaintiff's characterization of the officer's conduct as
showing improper motive and thus actual malice left the court unpersuaded." s That characterization "requires that we speculate and make
assumptions that simply are not justified by the record, even viewed

112. Id. "The doctrine of continuing tort applies here," the court asserted, affirming
the trial judge's denial of the city's motion to dismiss. Id.
113. 257 Ga. App. 665, 572 S.E.2d 34 (2002).
114. Id. at 665, 572 S.E.2d at 35. Plaintiff "brought this wrongful death action against
...[the officer] in his individual and official capacity as a police officer of the [city]." Id.,
572 S.E.2d at 35-36.
115. Id. at 665-66, 572 S.E.2d at 36. The officer had investigated the accident, and
plaintiff alleged that he "conspired with the remaining defendants to commit fraud.
Specifically, [plaintiffl contends that [the officer] deliberately excluded from his police
report information from a witness whose account of the accident placed fault [on the other
party] and that the officer destroyed the contact information for that witness." Id.
116. Id. at 667, 572 S.E.2d at 37. "'[Any cause of action averred against a municipal
police officer in his official, as opposed to his personal/individual, capacity is in reality suit[]
against the municipality.'" Id., 572 S.E.2d at 36-37 (quoting Pearson v. City of Atlanta,
231 Ga. App. 96, 101, 499 S.E.2d 89, 94 (1998)).
117. Id. at 667, 572 S.E.2d at 37; GA. CONST. art. I, § 2, para. 4. On the issue of
liability of local government officers and employees, see R. Perry Sentell, Jr., GeorgiaLocal
Government Officers: Rights for Their Wrongs, 13 GA. L. REV. 747 (1979); R. Perry Sentell,
Jr., Individual Liability in Georgia Local Government Law: The Haunting Hiatus of
Hennessy, 40 MERCER L. REV. 27 (1988); R. Perry Sentell, Jr., Local Government Tort
Liability: The Summer of'92, 9 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 405 (1993).
118. 257 Ga. App. at 668, 572 S.E.2d at 37. "[Plaintiff] argues that a question of fact
arises as to whether [the officer] acted with malice because of the business relationship
with [the other party to the accident]." Id. "These facts, [plaintiff] contends, show that
[the officer] acted with malice because he was motivated to help his ... friends." Id.
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most favorably to [plaintiffl."" 9 Absent a showing of actual malice,
120
official immunity required summary judgment in the officer's favor.
F

Zoning

Zoning litigation frequently presents as an item for resolution the
distinction between "zoning" and "regulation." The contrast, perhaps
less apparent than commonly assumed, can color a host of issues both
substantive and procedural. Substantively, the trial court in City of
Decatur v. DeKalb County12 1 reasoned that all municipal regulatory
ordinances constituted zoning measures and enjoined the city from
enforcing those ordinances against county construction projects inside
the municipality. 122 On review, the court of appeals found error in the
zoning-regulation assimilation 123 and delineated zoning ordinances as
"'those which regulate by classifying property into separate districts.""'24 Only municipal ordinances so characterized, the court held,
could not be enforced against county property located within the city and
used for governmental purposes. 125 Only for those
ordinances, there126
fore, could the trial court's decision be affirmed.
The supreme court likewise engaged the zoning-regulation distinction
in City of Walnut Grove v. Questco, Ltd. 127 regarding a comprehensive
sign ordinance admittedly enacted in violation of the Zoning Procedures

119. Id.
120. Id., 572 S.E.2d at 38. "Because [plaintiff] cannot show [the officer] acted with
malice, qualified [official] immunity provides [the officer] with protection from suit." Id.
121. 256 Ga. App. 46, 567 S.E.2d 376 (2002).
122. Id. at 48, 567 S.E.2d at 378. The litigation arose when the county accepted a
construction bid for a new county schoolhouse on property inside the city without obtaining
city permits and also began renovations on another county building so located. Id. at 47,
567 S.E.2d at 378.
123. Id. at 47, 567 S.E.2d at 378. "[Wle find that the trial court did err by concluding
that all other municipal building regulations fell under the broad category of zoning ..
Id.
124. Id. at 48,567 S.E.2d at 378 (quoting Fairfax MK, Inc. v. City of Clarkston, 274 Ga.
520, 521, 555 S.E.2d 722, 724 (2001)).
125. Id. at 47,567 S.E.2d at 378. "The Supreme Court of Georgia has held that countyowned property that is used for governmental purposes is not subject to municipal zoning
regulations." Id. (citing Macon Ass'n for Retarded Citizens v. Macon-Bibb County Planning
Comm'n, 252 Ga. 484, 489, 314 S.E.2d 218 (1984)). For treatment of the principle, see R.
Perry Sentell, Jr., Local Government Exposure to Local Government Zoning, 25 GA. ST. B.J.
180 (1989).
126. 256 Ga. App. at 47, 567 S.E.2d at 378. "Thus, the trial court did not err by
concluding that the [county] courthouse and the other county building at issue were not
subject to [municipal] zoning requirements." Id. For discussion of the regulation aspect
of the case, see supra text accompanying note 125.
127. 275 Ga. 266, 564 S.E.2d 445 (2002).
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Law. 128 Once again, judicial effort went to particularizing an overly
encompassing formulation, the city's insistence that sign ordinances
constituted "land use regulations." 1 29
A measure's characterization, 3 0 the court specified, depended on its "evaluat[ion] as a
whole."'
Applying that evaluation to the sign ordinance, the court
deemed it "clear that the ordinance divided the City into districts
(specifically, the existing zoning districts) and regulated the uses of signs
relative to the districts in which the signs were located."13 2 As a
zoning3 measure, the ordinance fell subject to the Zoning Procedures
Law." 3
The alleged conflict presented by M. Wayne Robinson BuilderDeveloper, Inc. v. City of Rome" pitted the city's historic preservation
zoning ordinance against its general zoning ordinance."' Specifically,
challengers maintained, the preservation ordinance invalidly failed to
require the planning commission's review as mandated by the general
zoning ordinance."16 Rejecting plaintiffs' position, the court of appeals
emphasized the preservation ordinance's later enactment: "'Where there
is a conflict between legislative acts, the later in time will control as it
is presumed to be the last expression of legislative will.'" '3 7 Consequently, the court upheld municipal adoption of
the preservation
8
ordinance without a planning commission review."3

128. Id. at 266, 564 S.E.2d at 446; O.C.G.A. §§ 36-66-1 to -5 (2000 & Supp. 2002).
129. 275 Ga. at 266, 564 S.E.2d at 446. "The City argues that sign ordinances are land
use regulations not subject to the ZPL." Id.
130. "Clearly, sign ordinances may be subject to the ZPL when they are drafted in such
a manner as to regulate the uses and development standards of property, i.e., signs, by
means of zones or districts." Id. at 266-67, 564 S.E.2d at 446.
131. Id. at 267, 564 S.E.2d at 447. The land use regulation must be "evaluated as a
whole to determine whether or not it involves dividing a governmental unit into zones or
districts and applying different standards to such zones or districts in regard to property
therein." Id.
132. Id.
133. Id. Accordingly, the ordinance was declared invalid and the trial court was held
to have correctly ordered the city to issue permits to the plaintiff. Id. at 266, 569 S.E.2d
at 446.
134. 255 Ga. App. 114, 564 S.E.2d 526 (2002).
135. Id. at 114, 564 S.E.2d at 527. "This case concerns a challenge to the validity of
[the city's] Historic Preservation Zoning Ordinance and the amendment to that ordinance
which added the street upon which [plaintiffs] own property." Id.
136. Id. at 115, 564 S.E.2d at 527. "Instead, the review was done by the Historic
Preservation Commission." Id., 564 S.E.2d at 528.
137. Id. at 117, 564 S.E.2d at 528-29 (quoting Patrick v. Head, 262 Ga. 654, 655, 424
S.E.2d 615, 616 (1993)).
138. Id., 564 S.E.2d at 529. "The . . . City Commission acted within its authority to
adopt the 1996 Historic Preservation Zoning Ordinance, revising the 1979 Historic District
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King v. City of Bainbridge139 featured an asserted conflict of a more
pervasive nature, that of federal preemption. There, a municipal zoning
ordinance excluded mobile homes from residential districts,'140 an
exclusion challenged as preempted by the National Manufactured
Housing and Safety Standards Act.14 ' Rejecting the challenge, the
supreme court read the federal statute to preempt any other "safety or
construction requirements."'
However, the court observed, "nothing
in the Act prevents localities from excluding mobile homes from certain
zoning districts.""
Additionally, the court confronted its own prior
decision invalidating mobile home zoning based on aesthetics and
145
protecting property values.'" Explicitly overruling that decision,
the court sustained the ordinance as a valid means of "regulat[ing] the
quality of housing stock and promot[ing] general safety concerns." 46
A trial judge's disposition of constitutionality drew mixed reactions
from the court in Town of Tyrone v. 7yrone, LLC. 14 On the one hand,

Zoning Ordinance, without a review or recommendation by the Planning Commission." Id.
139. 276 Ga. 484, 577 S.E.2d 772 (2003).
140. The city sued a landowner to enjoin her placement of a mobile home upon a
portion of her land lying within city limits, and the defendant challenged the validity of the
zoning ordinance upon which the city relied. Id. at 484-85, 577 S.E.2d 772-73.
141. Id. at 485, 577 S.E.2d at 773; 42 U.S.C. §§ 5401-5426 (2000).
142. 276 Ga. at 485-86, 577 S.E.2d at 773; 42 U.S.C. §§ 5401-5426. "Thus, any attempt
to place higher construction standards on mobile homes than those established under the
Act is invalid." 276 Ga. at 485-86, 577 S.E.2d at 773.
143. 276 Ga. at 486, 577 S.E.2d at 773. "By excluding HUD-certified mobile homes
from the R-2 district, the City has not imposed any safety or construction requirement on
the homes, but has simply determined that this type of housing is inappropriate in an R-2

district." Id.
144. Id. at 487, 577 S.E.2d at 775. "Under Cannon v. Coweta County [260 Ga. 56, 389
S.E.2d 329 (1990)] ... this [c]ourt held that a zoning ordinance that restricted mobile
homes to mobile home parks, based on aesthetic and protection of property values concerns,
was unconstitutional." Id.
145. Id. at 488, 577 S.E.2d at 775. "We now conclude that Cannon was wrongly
decided and hereby overrule it." Id.
146. Id. "These reasons are not arbitrary or unreasonable and bear a substantial
relation to the public health, safety, and general welfare. Therefore, the City's ordinance
is not unconstitutional." Id.
A dissenting opinion for two justices maintained that the federal statute had preempted
the zoning ordinance:
When all is said and done, it is clear that in enacting its ordinance the City was
motivated by a desire to legislate in the mobile home safety arena; and the City's
interpretation of the ordinance gives it that effect. The ordinance should not be
saved simply because it appears to be regular on its face.
Id. at 490, 577 S.E.2d at 777 (Thompson, J., dissenting).
147. 275 Ga. 383, 565 S.E.2d 806 (2002). A shopping center developer sought to have
the town rezone property from "agricultural-residential" to "commercial"; the council denied
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the court condemned the judge's order that the subject land be rezoned
from "agricultural-residential" to "commercial." 4 ' "'Courts have no
power to zone or rezone property,'"' 49 the court asserted, and "[o]nce
the trial court concluded that the current zoning was unconstitutional,
it should have ordered the town council to rezone the property to a
constitutional designation." 50 On the other hand, the court affirmed
the judge's determination that a portion of the property's present zoning
was invalid.' 5 ' Given testimony of experts and even the town's
planning consultant,'5 2 "the trial court did not clearly err in finding
that the property zoned agricultural-residential cannot be developed
under that classification."' 53
A prolonged zoning controversy finally concluded in Powell v. City of
Snellville,"' with the landowner's charge of a "temporary taking"
coming to naught. 55 Reviewing contested zonings and rezonings of
plaintiff's property between 1993 and 2000,156 the supreme court
reasoned that "[a] property owner does not suffer a compensable
temporary taking under the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution
unless the government has deprived a landowner of all use of the
property."'57 Neither contested zoning action, the court held, amount-

the request; and plaintiff sued to accomplish his ends. The trial court declared the
property's current zoning unconstitutional and ordered the town to rezone the property as
"commercial." Id. at 383-84, 565 S.E.2d at 807-08.
148. The judge's order constituted an excess of judicial power. Id. at 384, 565 S.E.2d
at 808.
149. Id. (quoting Hall Paving Co. v. Hall County, 237 Ga. 14, 15, 226 S.E.2d 728, 729
(1976)).
150. Id.
151. Id. at 386, 565 S.E.2d at 809.
152. Plaintiffs expert testified that the portion could not feasibly be developed for
residential use, and the planning consultant opined that the current zoning did not support
establishment of economic uses. Id. at 385-86, 565 S.E.2d at 809.
153. Id. at 386, 565 S.E.2d at 809. The same conclusion did not hold for the remaining
twenty-two acres of the property. Id.
154. 275 Ga. 207, 563 S.E.2d 860 (2002).
155. Id. at 207, 563 S.E.2d at 860.
156. Plaintiff owned property which she wished to sell for development as a parking
lot; she consented to municipal annexation in 1993 and objected to its original zoning as
"Office and Institutional" with an express parking lot prohibition; she protested a 1994
rezoning of the property to "Neighborhood Business" with a parking lot prohibition; and
she consented to a 2000 rezoning to "Planned Residential Community." Id. at 207-08, 563
S.E.2d at 863. Plaintiff contended that she was 'entitled to a jury trial to determine
whether she suffered a temporary taking entitling her to damages from 1993, when the city
initially improperly zoned her property, until the city zoned the property for a planned
residential community in 2000." Id. at 209, 563 S.E.2d at 863.
157. Id. at 209, 563 S.E.2d at 863.
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"'[T]he property owner still had possession
ed to such deprivation:'
and use of the land where she could have built in accordance with the
existing zoning or applied for a different type of zoning."" 59
Another instance of insufficient interest for complaint, Garden Hills
Civic Ass'n v. MetropolitanAtlanta Rapid Transit Authority,6 0 focused
on the issue of standing.' 6 ' There, a civic association and a landowner
challenged municipal rezoning of property being developed for "'office,
housing and retail"' uses.'6 2 According to the evidence, however, the
rather,
challenged rezoning had not "led to the development;"'
"defendants could have developed the property in the same manner
under the existing zoning."" s Consequently, the court of appeals held
to demonstrate any special damages and, thus,
that plaintiffs "failed
65
lacked standing."
The supreme court reached a similar conclusion, holding plaintiffs
devoid of a vested interest, in Meeks v. City of Buford. 66 The case
turned on a density variance on undeveloped land granted for the benefit
of a potential purchaser who in fact never purchased the subject
property.6 7 Plaintiffs subsequently purchased the property and, some
fifteen years later, claimed a vested entitlement to the variance.'6 s On
grounds that "since they purchased the property in 1986, [plaintiffs]
have made no significant expenditures in reliance on the variance,"6 9

158. Id.
159. Id. (quoting Cobb County v. McColister, 261 Ga. 876, 877, 413 S.E.2d 441, 443
(1992)).
160. 256 Ga. App. 367, 568 S.E.2d 586 (2002).
161. Id. at 367, 568 S.E.2d at 586.
162. Id., 568 S.E.2d at 587.
163. Id. at 368, 568 S.E.2d at 587.
164. Id. "[T]he evidence shows that [plaintiffs] were subject to the same harm
regardless of whether the property was rezoned." Id. Actually, "the rezoning was more
restrictive than the original zoning." Id.
165. Id. The court reflected that "[tihe appellants' true complaint is not that the
property was rezoned, but that it will be developed at all. However, such development is
to be expected in a thriving urban community. And the increase in inconvenience
stemming from urban growth-such as increased traffic-is insufficient to confer standing."
Id. at 368-69, 568 S.E.2d at 587-88 (citations omitted).
166. 275 Ga. 585, 571 S.E.2d 369 (2002).
167. The city had granted the variance in 1985. Id. at 585, 571 S.E.2d at 370.
168. Id. at 586, 571 S.E.2d at 370. Although plaintiffs purchased the property in 1986,
they did not lay claim to the benefit of the variance (for a potential sale) until 1999. Id.
at 585-86, 571 S.E.2d at 370.
169. Id. at 587, 571 S.E.2d at 371. In order to acquire a vested right, "the landowner
must in good faith have 'made a substantial change of position in relation to the land,
made substantial expenditures, or have incurred substantial obligations.'" Id. (quoting
Barker v. Forsyth County, 248 Ga. 73, 76, 281 S.E.2d 549, 552 (1981)).
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the 0court held that they lacked a "vested right" to so use the proper17

ty.

II.
A.

COUNTIES

Officers and Employees

Office eligibility and job security constituted dominating concerns for
county officers and employees during the survey period. Hardin v.
Brookins 171 featured a citizen's quo warranto action against a county
school board member on grounds that the latter, six years earlier,
pleaded nolo contendere in Florida to possession of a controlled
substance.172 Plaintiff relied on a Georgia statute declaring one's
173
ineligibility to public office if convicted and sentenced to a felony,
and defendant countered with a statute declaring a nolo plea insufficient
to affect civil disqualification for public office.1 74 The two statutes,
reasoned the supreme court, "are in pari materia and must be construed
together." 75 So positioned, the court rejected plaintiff's argument that
the exemption enactment applied "only to one who enters a nolo plea in
Georgia. " 1 76
Accordingly, defendant "would be disqualified from

170. Id. Accordingly, "the trial court did not err in refusing to give effect to the
variance." Id. at 587-88, 571 S.E.2d at 371. A dissenting opinion maintained that a
variance is not personal to the owner of land and is available to a subsequent purchaser
as long as it has not expired or been revoked. Id. at 588, 571 S.E.2d at 371 (Carley, J.,
dissenting).
171. 275 Ga. 477, 569 S.E.2d 511 (2002).
172. Id. at 477, 569 S.E.2d at 511. For an extensive study of quo warranto and its
pervasiveness in Georgia local government law, see R. PERRY SENTELL, JR., THE WRIT OF
Quo WARRANTO IN GEORGIA LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAw (1987).
173. Id.; O.C.G.A. § 45-2-1(3) (2002). The statute applies to one "'finally convicted and
sentenced for any felony involving moral turpitude under the laws of this or any other state
when the offense is also a felony in this state . . . .'" 275 Ga. at 477, 569 S.E.2d at 511
(quoting O.C.G.A. § 45-2-1(3)).
174. 275 Ga. at 477-78, 569 S.E.2d at 511; O.C.G.A. § 17-7-95(c) (1997 & Supp. 2002).
Section 17-7-95(c) provides that a nolo plea "'shall not be deemed a plea of guilty for the
purpose of effecting any civil disqualification of the defendant to hold public office.. .'"
275 Ga. at 478, 569 S.E.2d at 511 (quoting O.C.G.A. § 17-7-95(c).
175. 275 Ga. at 478, 569 S.E.2d at 512. For an extensive study of in pari materia and
its pervasiveness in Georgia statutory construction, see R. Perry Sentell, Jr., Statutory
Constructionin Georgia:The Doctrine of In Pari Materia, printed in R. PERRY SENTELL, JR.,
STUDIES IN GEORGIA STATUTORY LAw 259 (1996).
176. 275 Ga. at 478, 569 S.E.2d at 512. Plaintiff "contends that [the disqualification
statute] is applicable here, but that [the exemption statute] is not because [defendant]
entered his plea in Florida." Id. Said the court: "Thus, the decisive factor is not where the
nolo plea was entered, but simply whether the individual was convicted of a crime which
is recognized as a disqualifying offense under Georgia law." Id. at 479, 569 S.E.2d at 512.
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holding public office pursuant to [the disqualification statute], but he is
exempted from such disqualification by [the exemption statute]."'7 7
Challengers in Wheeler County Board of Tax Assessors v. Gilder 7 '
charged the ineligibility of a county tax assessor who simultaneously
served on the county Board of Agricultural Stabilization and Conservation Committee ("ASC"). 179 First, the court of appeals rejected plaintiffs' reliance upon a statute prohibiting tax assessors from holding "any
state, county, or municipal office." 8 ° Defendant's ASC position was a
"federal office,"' 8 ' the court delineated, a position "clearly . . . excluded"'82 from the statutory prohibition.'8 3 Second, the court likewise
held defendant excluded from a statute declaring ineligible for "any civil
office"" persons who also hold "'any office of profit or trust under the
government of the United States.'"'8 5 County ASC members are not
determined by a county "popular election,"8 6 the court reasoned, and
thus fall within the statute's exemption for "appointed officers."8 7
Terminations and demotions also featured prominently in this year's
litigational corpus. In Grady County Board of Education v. Hickerson,18 8 the supreme court sustained a trial judge's mandamus ordering
the school board to affirm or reverse an independent tribunal's decision

177. Id. at 479, 569 S.E.2d at 512. "The trial court correctly construed the applicable
statutes and properly ruled in favor of [defendant]." Id.
178. 256 Ga. App. 478, 568 S.E.2d 786 (2002).
179. "The county ASC committee is a federal committee created by authority of the Soil
Conservation and Domestic Allotment Act and administers programs related to the
prevention of soil erosion conducted by the United States Department of Agriculture ....
16 U.S.C. § 590a; 52 [F.R.] 48511; 7 [C.F.R.] Part 7." 256 Ga. App. at 478, 568 S.E.2d at
787.
180. 256 Ga. App. at 479, 568 S.E.2d at 788; O.C.G.A. § 48-5-295(a) (2002).
181. 256 Ga. App. at 479, 568 S.E.2d at 788; O.C.G.A. § 48-5-295(a) (1999 & Supp.
2003).
182. 256 Ga. App. at 479, 568 S.E.2d at 788.
183. Id. "The right to hold office is the rule and ineligibility is the exception." Id.
184. Id. at 479-80, 568 S.E.2d at 788.
185. Id. (quoting O.C.G.A. § 45-2-1 (2002)).
186. "[I1f membership of a governing structure is not determined through a popular
election in which the residents of the county participate, the nature of the governing
structure is appointive." Id. at 480-81, 568 S.E.2d at 789.
187. Id. at 481, 568 S.E.2d at 789. "Thus, the position of county ASC committee
member is appointed and meets the first requirement for exemption from the ineligibility
provision of [O.C.G.PAi section] 45-2-1." Id. The court also held defendant's ASC position
temporary in nature and not such as would "materiallyinterfere with his duties as a tax
assessor." Id.
188. 275 Ga. 580, 571 S.E.2d 391 (2002).
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that the board had terminated a school superintendent without
cause. 189 The parties having agreed to specified statutory procedures, 90 the court found the superintendent was entitled to the board's
decision in order to exhaust his administrative remedies under the
contract and pursue his claim in superior court.' 9'
The court of appeals dealt with exhaustion of administrative remedies
in Crumpler v. Henry County, 9 ' involving the county manager's
demotion of a police officer.' 9 Opposing the officer's effort at certiorari
review by the superior court, the county insisted that plaintiff must first
Denying the soundness of the
appeal to the county commissioners.'
county's position, the court employed a two-step reasoning process.' 95
Initially, the court interpreted a county ordinance to provide plaintiff
96
only the right of a "discretionary appeal" to the commissioners.
Second, the court held that the county manager's decision constituted a
"quasi-judicial action subject to certiorari review."' 9 7 Consequently,
plaintiff "was entitled to petition for a writ of certiorari without first
asking the board of county commissioners to review his case." 198
In Norris v. Henry County, 9 9 the court rejected an employee's
complaint that he was afforded no hearing prior to termination for
189. "The Board failed to affirm or reverse the tribunal's decision, and [plaintiff] filed
this mandamus action seeking a ruling that the Board was required to make such a
decision." Id. at 580-81, 571 S.E.2d at 391.
190. Id. at 581, 571 S.E.2d at 391; O.C.G.A. § 20-2-940 (2001). "Those procedures
include a requirement that, after an employment decision by a tribunal, a local board of
education must issue a ruling on the tribunal's decision within ten days of the board's
receipt of the transcript of the hearing before the tribunal." 275 Ga. at 581 n.2, 571 S.E.2d
at 392 n.2.
191. 275 Ga. at 581, 571 S.E.2d at 391-92. For extensive examination of the role of
mandamus in the law of local government, see R. PERRY SENTELL, JR., MISCASTING
MANDAMUS IN GEORGIA LocAL GOVERNMENT LAw (1989).
192. 257 Ga. App. 615, 571 S.E.2d 822 (2002).
193. Actually, the officer was demoted by the police department and he appealed to the
county manager who affirmed the demotion. Id. at 615-16, 571 S.E.2d at 823.
194. Id. at 616, 571 S.E.2d at 823.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 617, 571 S.E.2d at 824. The county ordinance "provides that a county
employee 'shall have the right to petition the Board of Commissioners to review a decision
of the county manager which upholds or imposes ... a demotion . . . .'" Id. at 616, 571
S.E.2d at 824. Observed the court: "[Nlothing in the ordinance requires an employee to
petition for discretionary review before seeking certiorari in the superior court." Id.
197. Id. at 618, 571 S.E.2d at 825. "The hearing before the county manager was a
quasi-judicial hearing because it included notice, a hearing, and factual findings and
conclusions." Id. at 617-18, 571 S.E.2d at 825.
198. Id. at 618, 571 S.E.2d at 825. The court thus reversed the trial judge's dismissal
of the officer's petition for certiorari. Id. at 620, 571 S.E.2d at 826.
199. 255 Ga. App. 718, 566 S.E.2d 428 (2002).
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incompetence. 20 0 A post-termination hearing before the county manager met all plaintiff's due process requirements, 20 1 the court reasoned,
and the trial judge properly employed an "any evidence" standard of
review.' °2
Under that standard, there was "at least some evidence"20 3 to uphold plaintiff's termination.0 4
B.

Regulation

A major county regulatory issue of the survey period manifested itself
in Rabun County v. Georgia Transmission Corp.,2°' an electric membership corporation's challenge to a county ordinance imposing a threeyear moratorium on the construction of high-voltage power lines. 0 6

200. Id. at 718-19, 566 S.E.2d at 429. Plaintiff, a county pipe crew foreman, was in
charge of a project in which a county track hoe was damaged. The following week,
plaintiffs supervisor gave him a letter of termination based on plaintiffs incompetence as
exhibited by the track hoe incident and by a long history of job performance problems. Id.
201. Id. at 719, 566 S.E.2d at 429-30. "Although due process entitles the public
employee to a pre-termination hearing, the employer's failure to provide one is not a
constitutional violation under the due process clause if the employer (as here) provides a
later procedural remedy." Id. The county manager had provided plaintiff a two-day
hearing attended by plaintiff and his attorney. As for plaintiffs argument that the county
had failed to follow its own personnel manual, the court asserted that "the adequacy of due
process is governed not by personnel manuals but by case law interpreting the federal and
state constitutions, which only require that the employee (even if later) be notified and
given an opportunity to be heard." Id. at 719-20, 566 S.E.2d at 430.
202. Id. at 720, 566 S.E.2d at 430. "The appropriate standard of review to be applied
to issues of fact on writ of certiorari to the superior court is whether the decision below was
supported by any evidence.'" Id. (quoting City of Atlanta v. Smith, 228 Ga. App. 864, 865,
493 S.E.2d 51, 52 (1997)).
203. Id. at 721, 566 S.E.2d at 431.
204. Id. The court thus affirmed the trial judge's affirmance of the county's termination
decision. Id.
In the period case of HarrisCounty Sheriffs Office v. Negrete, 259 Ga. App. 891, 578
S.E.2d 579 (2003), the court of appeals affirmed a superior court in sustaining the
administrative law judge's award of workers compensation to a county deputy sheriff
injured in a collision while driving a county patrol car to his part-time job as a security
guard. Id. at 891, 578 S.E.2d at 579. Reviewing county policies authorizing all the officer's
actions, the court found that "the ostensibly 'off-duty' deputy is shown to have been acting
in a capacity little different from an on-duty officer." Id. at 893, 578 S.E.2d at 581.
205. 276 Ga. 81, 575 S.E.2d 474 (2003). For perspective on local government regulatory
power, see R. Perry Sentell, Jr., "AscertainableStandards"versus 'Unbridled Discretion"
in Local Government Regulation, 41 GA. COUNTY Gov. MAG. 19 (Dec. 1989); R. Perry
Sentell, Jr., Discretion in Local Government Law, 8 GA. L. REV. 614 (1974); R. Perry
Sentell, Jr., Reasoningby Riddle: The Power to Prohibitin GeorgiaLocal Government Law,
9 GA. L. REV. 115 (1974).
206. The ordinance elaborated the expressed fears of county citizens about possible
health dangers from electromagnetic fields, and imposed the three-year moratorium on
high-voltage lines in the county in order to await further research on the problem. 276 Ga.
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Reviewing the ordinance's potential effects on the challenger's conceded
power of eminent domain,1 7 the supreme court invalidated the
measure on two grounds." 8 First, the constitution's county home rule
provision expressly precludes any '"[aiction affecting the exercise of the
Under material eminent domain
power of eminent domain."'2 °9
statutes, 1 ° "the condemning body, not the [county] governing authority, is to be the 'exclusive judge' of the 'necessities of the public
needs.'"2 11
Second, the court continued, under the constitution's
interpreted principle of "state preemption,"2 12 the county ordinance
"directly contravenes the [statutory] mandate.., that grants [plaintiff],
as the condemning body, the exclusive power to decide the 'necessities
of the public needs."'2 13

at 81-82, 575 S.E.2d at 475. Plaintiff electric membership corporation had for several years
been planning the construction of a 115-kilovolt transmission line which would cross
approximately seven miles of the county. Id. at 82, 575 S.E.2d at 475.
207. Id. at 84-85, 575 S.E.2d at 476-77. "Certainly, GTC is empowered to exercise
eminent domain as provided in [O.C.G.A. section] 46-3-201(b)(9)... . It is undisputed that
GTC will have to condemn property in order to effectuate the project as currently proposed,
and that the ordinance will halt the project." Id.
208. Id. at 81, 575 S.E.2d at 474.
209. Id. at 86, 575 S.E.2d at 477 (quoting GA. CONST. art. IX, § 2, para. 1). For
extensive treatment of local government home rule, see R. Perry Sentell, Jr., The Georgia
Home Rule System, 50 MERCER L. REV. 99 (1998).
210. O.C.G.A. § 22-2-102.1 (1982 & Supp. 2002).
211. 276 Ga. at 86-87, 575 S.E.2d at 478. Even so, the court qualified, the condemning
body is not absolutely unfettered in its determination of necessity. Id. at 87, 575 S.E.2d
at 478. For treatment of possible limitations on local government condemnation, see R.
Perry Sentell, Jr., Condemning Local Government Condemnation, 39 MERCER L. REV. 11
(1987).
212. 276 Ga. at 87, 575 S.E.2d at 478; GA. CONST. art. III, § 6, para. 4. For treatment
of the court's move to "preemption" under the constitution's uniformity clause, see R. Perry
Sentell, Jr., The Georgia Supreme Court and Local Government Law: Two Sheets to the
Wind, 16 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 361 (1999).
213. 276 Ga. at 87, 575 S.E.2d at 478 (quoting O.C.G.A. § 22-2-102.1 (1982 & Supp.
2003)). The court said that the county ordinance made the determination that it was
feasible to meet electric power needs in the area without construction of plaintiffs proposed
high-voltage line, thereby directly contradicting statutory direction that the determination
be made by the condemning body. Id.
A replay of the litigation occurred in Cobb County v. Georgia Transmission Corp., 276
Ga. 367, 578 S.E.2d 852 (2003). The "only significant differences" observed the court, were
the length of the prohibition (seven and one-half months instead of three years), the
prohibition of all power lines ("regardless of whether they are above-ground"), and the
prohibition's "application to lines which exceed 35, rather than 115, kilovolts." Id. at 36768, 578 S.E.2d at 853. These were only "differences ... in degree," the court asserted,
concluding that the ordinance "on its face, violates the home rule provision of the Georgia
Constitution." Id. at 368, 578 S.E.2d at 853.
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The regulatory challenge of Home BuildersAss'n of Savannah, Inc. v.
Chatham County214 targeted the county's collection of fees for building

permits and occupancy certificates. 215 Specifically, plaintiffs alleged,
those fees exceeded the true costs of services for which they were
charged and lacked a rational relation to the costs of services provided. 21" Reviewing the trial judge's summary judgment for the county,
the supreme court noted evidence of a fee increase at a time when the
reserve fund amounted to two million dollars, 2 7 as well as fund payouts to various county entities. 21 8 That evidence, the court concluded,
raised outstanding issues of material fact remaining for decision and
precluded the grant of summary judgment.1 9
Contrarily, but in the special context of a mandamus proceeding,22 °
the court sustained the county's regulatory discretion in Fulton County
v. Congregation of Anshei Chesed.22 ' There, plaintiffs demanded
issuance of a county permit authorizing the use of a single family
residence as a place of worship. 222 Focusing upon the material resolution, the court emphasized both its conferral of limited discretion in
evaluating use permit requests223 and its list of general factors for the

214. 276 Ga. 243, 577 S.E.2d 564 (2003).
215. Id. at 244, 577 S.E.2d at 565. The county Inspections Department
issues building permits, certificates of occupancy, and enforces zoning ordinances
and building codes in the unincorporated portions of [the county], also known as
the Special Service District ("SSD"). Inspections collects [the fees] in addition to
other fees in order to fund the services it provides. Fees obtained by Inspections
are placed in the SSD special revenue fund.

Id.
216. Id. at 245, 577 S.E.2d at 566. "The various claims asserted by [plaintiffs] are
grounded on the assertion that the County imposed unlawfully high fees throughout this
entire period of time which were substantially in excess of its operating costs and that the
surplus was improperly spent on other projects, departments, and governmental entities."

Id.
217.

Id.

That fact, the court said, was some evidence of unreasonable excess. Id.

218. Id. It could not be determined as a matter of law, the court said, that the
expenditures were solely for proper purposes. Id., 577 S.E.2d at 565.
219. Id., 577 S.E.2d at 566. "Because outstanding issues of material fact remain to be
decided, we hold that summary judgment was improperly granted to the County." Id.
220. For an extensive examination of that context, see R. PERRY SENTELL, JR.,
MISCASTING MANDAMUS IN GEORGIA LocAL GoVERNMENT LAw (1989).
221. 275 Ga. 856, 860, 572 S.E.2d 530, 533 (2002).
222. Id. at 856-57, 572 S.E.2d at 530-31. Plaintiffs "sought a court order requiring the
county to permit the land [zoned single family residences] to be used for a house of
worship." Id. The trial court found plaintiffs to possess a clear legal right to the permit
and ordered the issuance of a mandamus. Id. at 857, 572 S.E.2d at 530-31.
223. Id. at 858, 572 S.E.2d at 532. "The Zoning Resolution of [the county] allows places
of worship to be located in residential zoning pursuant to the approval of a use permit...
and provides that the Board of Commissioners 'may exercise limited discretion in
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A mandamus applicant must show the
county's consideration.2 4
county's "gross abuse of discretion"2 2 in denying the permit,226 the
court reasoned-a showing rendered impossible by evidence supporting
the county's decision.227 Employing its requisite "any evidence standard of review,"228 the court reversed the trial judge's issuance of the
mandamus.22 9
The court of appeals primary venture into county regulation unfolded
in Cherokee County v. Greater Atlanta Homebuilders Ass'n. 2 " That
episode featured a county ordinance (enacted under express authority of
state statute) 22 1 imposing impact fees on new developments in the
county's unincorporated area.232 Developers attacked the ordinance's
method of mandating the county's use of generated fees "to construct
new facilities in six infrastructure areas."233 Those facilities would
also benefit new developments in the county's incorporated (municipal)
areas, developments paying no impact fees. 234 This unequal treatment
of incorporated and unincorporated areas, plaintiffs charged, violated
both due process and equal protection. 235 Reversing the trial judge's
decision of invalidity, the court reasoned that the resulting differentia-

evaluating the site proposed for a use which requires a use permit.'" Id.
224. Td. at 859, 572 S.E.2d at 532. The resolution authorized the board to consider
"eleven general factors" and "four factors specific to places of worship." Id. Necessarily,
the court observed, the consideration of such criteria "requires the local governing body to
exercise discretion." Id. n.7.
225. Id. at 859, 572 S.E.2d at 532.
226. Id. "[A] disappointed applicant who seeks mandamus relief from the superior
court must show that the local governing body's denial of the special use permit constituted
a gross abuse of discretion." Id.
227. Id. The transcript showed that several commissioners opposing the permit were
opposed to introducing an "institutional" use to an area used for single family residences.
Id., 572 S.E.2d at 533.
228. Id., 572 S.E.2d at 532. The standard of review "is whether there is any evidence
supporting the decision of the local governing body, not whether there is any evidence
supporting the decision of the superior court." Id.
229. Id. at 859-60, 572 S.E.2d at 533. "Since the record contains evidence supporting
the decision of the Board of Commissioners, we must reverse the trial court." Id.
230. 255 Ga. App. 764, 566 S.E.2d 470 (2002).
231. Id. at 764, 566 S.E.2d at 470; O.C.G.A. §§ 36-71-1 to -13 (2000).
232. The court sketched the process via which the amounts of the fees would be
calculated and the basis of those calculations. 255 Ga. App. at 765, 566 S.E.2d at 472-73.
233. Id., 566 S.E.2d at 472. Infrastructure areas included libraries, parks, road
services, and the like. Id.
234. "[Plaintiffs'] primary complaint about the impact fees is that the county imposed
the fees only on new developments in unincorporated portions of the county, allowing new
developments in incorporated portions of the county, which would also benefit from the
countywide system improvements, a 'free ride.'" Id. at 766-67, 566 S.E.2d at 473.
235. Id. at 767, 566 S.E.2d at 473-74.
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tion did not equal county discrimination.
The county had imposed
fees in all areas statutorily authorized,23 7 and it "simply has no power
or control over developments in municipal limits."2 38
Thus, the
absence of impact fees on developments in municipalities resulted not
from county action,2 39 but rather from municipal decisions against
24 °
imposing the 24fees.
Plaintiffs' attack, the court asserted, "falls of its
1
own weight."

C.

Openness

The court of appeals dealt with issues of governmental openness in
two contexts: "open meetings" and "open records." 42 As for meetings,
Georgia's Open Meetings Act 2' requires the award of attorney fees

236. Id. at 769, 566 S.E.2d at 475. Equal protection, the court reasoned, does not
prevent a reasonable classification, and due process requires only a "rational basis." Id.
at 767, 566 S.E.2d at 473-74.
237. Id. at 768, 566 S.E.2d at 474. The court noted that plaintiffs had been "careful not
to challenge the constitutionality of the enabling statutes," but only the county ordinance.
Id.
238. Id.
239. Id. "The county has imposed an impact fee on all new developments within the
unincorporated portions of the county, which is all it has the power to do. It has not made
a 'classification' exempting incorporated developments from the fees . . . ." Id.
240. Id.
The reason new developments in municipalities do not pay the fees is not because
of any legislative distinction or action by the county, but results from decisions by
the municipalities not to impose such fees and not to enter into optional
intergovernmental agreements with the county regarding such.
Id.
241. Id.
"We hold that the entire ordinance and CIE [method for calculating
expenditures of fees] are constitutional and in conformance with the enabling statute.. .
Id. at 766, 566 S.E.2d at 473.
Finally, though not technically a county "power" case, Bickford v. Yancey Development
Co., 258 Ga. App. 371, 574 S.E.2d 349 (2002), featured a controversy over restrictive
covenants on defendant's land for which the county had issued a clearing permit.
Adjoining landowners argued that the covenants were created in 1977 and automatically
renewed in 1993. Id. at 372, 574 S.E.2d at 350. Holding that no covenants presently
existed, the court of appeals reasoned that under general law (O.C.G.A. § 44-5-60(b) (1991
& Supp. 2003)), covenants established in 1977 automatically expired twenty years later in
1997. Id. at 373, 574 S.E.2d at 351. Moreover, the court held, the automatic renewal
statute of 1993 (O.C.G.A. § 44-5-60(d) (1991 & Supp. 2003)) did not retroactively apply to
covenants which arose prior to 1993. Id. For a discussion of restrictive covenants and
zoning in local government law, see R. Perry Sentell, Jr., Restrictive Covenantsand Zoning:
A Dynamic Duo, 30 URBAN GA. MAG. 16 (Sept. 1980).
242. For an early discussion of the "openness movement" in Georgia local government
law, see R. Perry Sentell, Jr. The Omen of "Openness"in Local Government Law, 13 GA.
L. REV. 97 (1978).
243. O.C.G.A. §§ 50-14-1 to -5 (2002).
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upon the court's determination that an agency violated the statute
"without substantial justification."2 "
In Evans County Board of
Commissioners v. Claxton Enterprise,2" the court inquired whether a
judge could award such fees once the judge had determined that erring
county commissioners had not acted in "bad faith."2 46 Affrning the
award, the court asserted that "acting without substantial justification
and acting in bad faith are not synonymous."24 7 The court did, however, view the evidence to sustain the judge's finding that "the Board's
closure of the meetings and untimely filing of the minutes and affidavit
lacked substantial justification."2 "
A second issue in the case, an issue of "first impression" in Georgia,
concerned the availability of attorney fees for work done in appellate
litigation.24 9 Upholding that award as well, the court relied both upon
specific statutory language and upon the statute's general purpose of
encouraging private enforcement.25 ° "Because appeal is often an
integral part of litigation to enforce the Act, recovery of attorney fees
should not exclude those incurred on appeal."251
In Wiggins v. Board of Commissioners of Tift County,25 2 a county
official charged the county commissioners' violations of the Open and
Public Meetings Act 253 and sought injunctive relief.254 The court of

244. Id. § 50-14-5(b).
245. 255 Ga. App. 656, 566 S.E.2d 399 (2002).
246. Id. at 656, 566 S.E.2d at 399. The trial judge had reached this determination in
his first consideration of the case, remanded by virtue of the court of appeals decision in
ClaxtonEnterprise v. Evans County Board of Commissioners, 249 Ga. App. 870, 549 S.E.2d
830 (2001). On remand, the judge had found that the county commissioners' violation
lacked substantial justification. Id. at 657, 566 S.E.2d at 401. The county contended that
the judge's original determination on lack of bad faith foreclosed his remand decision on
lack of substantial justification. Id. at 658, 566 S.E.2d at 401-02.
247. Id. a. 658, 566 S.E.2d at 401.
248. Id., 566 S.E.2d at 402. "One meaning of 'lacked substantial justification' is
'substantially groundless.'" Id., 566 S.E.2d at 401.
249. Id. at 657, 566 S.E.2d at 401. "[Tlhe Board argued that the [plaintiff] could
recover only attorney fees associated with trial court litigation, not those for appellate
litigation." Id.
250. Id. at 659, 566 S.E.2d at 402. The court asserted that "nothing in the Act limits
recovery of attorney fees to those incurred in trial court litigation." Id. Rather, the
statute's use of the word "proceeding" might apply "to a court of any level." Id.
251. Id. The court noted that courts in other states had reached similar conclusions.
Id. n.l1.
252. 258 Ga. App. 666, 574 S.E.2d 874 (2002).
253. O.C.G.A. §§ 50-14-1 to -5 (2002).
254. 258 Ga. App. at 666-67, 574 S.E.2d at 875. The court deemed it curious that
plaintiff (the Director of the County Office of Community Development) sought only relief
from future violations of the statute while at the same time he alleged such past violations
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appeals disapproved of the trial judge's injunction mandating county
compliance with "all provisions of the Act." 25 5 By granting injunctive
relief against the board from future violations, the judge had simply
required the board's compliance with the law, "a duty which it already
had and as to which relief in equity is generally unavailable."256
Moreover, the court concluded, "courts of equity jurisdiction will not
intervene to 'allay mere apprehensions of injury ....

,.

D. Roads
"[T]he legal mechanism for a county to abandon a road,"258 the
subject of Talbot County Board of Commissioners v. Woodall,25 s
requires that the "county must give notice to property owners located on
the road ....,26o

Because at the time in issue (1984),261 the relevant

statute made no mention of notification method,262 the supreme court
looked to "later enactments to determine the legislative intent."26 In
1994 the legislature had amended the statute to require notice by
publication, 26' but also retained the former statute's "language requiring 'notice to property owners located thereon.'" 26 ' Accordingly, the
court reasoned, "the legislature must have intended to add a requirement different from the requirement of notice to adjoining property owners." 266 That indicated intention, the court concluded, "demonstrates
that notice by publication does not satisfy the notice to adjoining
property owners requirement."267 Thus, the court held that petitioners'
as a closed meeting, a lack of notice, the absence of an accurate agenda, and untimely
publication of the minutes. Id. at 668, 574 S.E.2d at 875-76.
255. Id. at 667, 574 S.E.2d at 875. However, the trial judge also ordered all discovery
terminated, a decision which the court here affirmed "under the right for any reason
principle." Id.
256. Id. at 668, 574 S.E.2d at 876 (citing O.C.G.A. § 9-5-2 (1982 & Supp. 2002)).
257. Id. at 669, 674 S.E.2d at 876 (quoting Morton v. Gardner, 242 Ga. 852, 856, 252
S.E.2d 413, 416 (1979)).
258. Talbot County Bd. of Comm'rs v. Woodall, 275 Ga. 281, 282, 565 S.E.2d 465, 466
(2002).
259. 275 Ga. 281, 565 S.E.2d 465 (2002).
260. Id. at 282, 565 S.E.2d at 466.
261. Landowners sought a declaratory judgment that the county had abandoned two
roads in 1984 and that title had passed to the landowners. As for the statutorily required
notice to adjoining landowners, petitioners could only show the county's publication of
notice in the county's legal organ. Id. at 281, 565 S.E.2d at 466.
262. O.C.G.A. § 32-7-2 (2001 & Supp. 2002).
263. 275 Ga. at 282, 565 S.E.2d at 466.
264. 1994 Ga. Laws 294; O.C.G.A. § 32-7-2(b)(1) (2001).
265. 275 Ga. at 282, 565 S.E.2d at 466 (quoting 1994 Ga. Laws 294, § 1).
266. Id. at 282-83, 565 S.E.2d at 466.
267. Id. at 283, 565 S.E.2d at 466-67.
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showing of notice by publication failed to show sufficient notice for
county abandonment of the roads.
E. Finances
At issue in City of Decatur v. DeKalb County2 69 was the validity of
a county's contract to disburse annually to municipalities a portion of
proceeds collected under the Homestead Option Sales and Use Tax
("HOST") statute. 7 ° Because of minimal county controls over the
disbursed funds, the court of appeals held that the agreement violated
the HOST statute.271 Although the statute requires the expenditure
of not more than twenty percent of tax receipts for capital outlay projects, 2 the court emphasized other mandates that the tax be exclusively collected for and distributed to the county.273 In violation of
those mandates, the court perceived, the contract sought "to shift that
[expenditure] responsibility to the municipalities."274 In the absence
of "some form of legislative authority, it is inappropriate for a county to
simply give its tax revenue to a municipality and allow that municipality
to control what is done with the revenue." 275 The contract, the court
concluded, "is contrary to the express language of the
276 HOST statute, is
not authorized by law, and therefore cannot stand."

268. Id., 565 S.E.2d at 467. "Therefore, [petitioners'] showing that notice was made by
publication did not satisfy the statutory requirement." Id.
269. 255 Ga. App. 868, 567 S.E.2d 332 (2002).
270. O.C.G.A. §§ 48-8-100 to -109 (2002); 255 Ga. App. at 868, 567 S.E.2d at 333.
271. 255 Ga. App. at 870, 567 S.E.2d at 334. 'Contrary to the structure set forth in the
statute, the county has little power under the agreement to control what is done with the
tax proceeds once they are given to the municipalities." Id.
272. O.C.G.A. § 48-8-104(c)(2)(A) (2002).
273. 255 Ga. App. at 870, 567 S.E.2d at 334; O.C.G.A. §§ 48-8-104(a), (c)(2)(A).
274. 255 Ga. App. at 870, 567 S.E.2d at 334. "Although the statute expressly provides
that the county bears the responsibility for expending the tax proceeds for capital outlay
projects, the Intergovernmental Agreement seeks to shift that responsibility to the
municipalities." Id.
275. Id. "'[It can never be a valid county purpose to provide [its tax] revenue to a
municipality, because municipalities are not citizens of nor creatures of counties-they are
an entirely different form of government.'" Id. (quoting City Council of Augusta v.
Mangelly, 243 Ga. 358, 362, 254 S.E.2d 315, 319 (1979)).
276. Id. at 871, 567 S.E.2d at 334. 'If the legislature had intended for counties to share
HOST proceeds with cities in the manner described in the Intergovernmental Agreement,
it could have so stated." Id. at 870-71, 567 S.E.2d at 334.
As this Article went to press, the Georgia Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals
decision. City of Decatur v. DeKalb County, No. S02G1617, 2003 WL 22532528 (Ga. Nov.
10, 2003). The supreme court held that, via both constitutional provision (art. IX, § 2,
para. 6) and the "HOST" statute itself, the county's agreement with the cities was
authorized. "Thus, HOST ... implements a district tax under the 'special district'
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Randolph County v. Settles Bros.277 involved a county's security
interest in machinery under a 1992 promissory note obtained by the
county for a loan to defendant.278 In 1995 another entity assumed
defendant's indebtedness on the note and purchased defendant's assets
(including the pledged machinery), but defendant remained liable on the
note. Under the 1995 agreement, the county was to file a financial
statement to continue its security interest in the machinery, but the
county failed to file the statement. Later, the acquiring entity allowed
the note to go into default, 9 and the original financing statement
expired by law after five years."' Upon the county's subsequent suit
against defendant,2 81 the court held the county had lost its perfected
security interest by failing to file the continuation statement.2 2
Accordingly, the court affirmed a decision releasing defendant
from
23
liability on the note to the extent of the value of the machinery.

[c]onstitutional provision." Decatur,2003 WL22532528, at *1. The court reasoned that the
court of appeals reliance upon City Council of Augusta v. Mangelly "is misplaced." Id.
In the survey period case of Plyman v. Glynn County, 276 Ga. 426, 578 S.E.2d 124 (2003),
taxpayers sued to enjoin the county's collection of a special local option sales tax
("SPLOST") on grounds that the county could not (as it had agreed to do) lawfully "expend
SPLOST funds to improve facilities owned and operated by the City and [a state park
authority]." Id. at 427, 578 S.E.2d at 125. Observing that plaintiffs had waited forty-two
days after certification of the SPLOST vote results to file the action, the court analogized
to the statute (O.C.G.A. § 21-2-524 (2003)) requiring election contests to be brought within
five days. Id. at 428, 578 S.E.2d at 126. Because this SPLOST had gone into effect only
one hundred days after vote certification, the court reasoned that "by the time plaintiffs
brought suit, the revenue department had already expended a considerable amount of
resources to prepare for [the tax]." Id. Given the need to avoid uncertainty and confusion
in the operation of government, the court held "that plaintiffs' claim is barred by the
doctrine of laches." Id.
277. 259 Ga. App. 395, 577 S.E.2d 1 (2003).
278. Id. at 395, 577 S.E.2d at 1. "The loan was made pursuant to the Employment
Incentive Program administered by the Georgia Department of Community Affairs." Id.
n.1.
279. This happened in May 1997. Id.
280. This happened in September 1997. Id.
281. Id., 577 S.E.2d at 2. In February 1998, the county sued defendant to collect the
remaining balance due on the note. Id.
282. Id. at 396, 577 S.E.2d at 2.
283. Id. at 395, 577 S.E.2d at 1.
When the County lost the machinery as collateral without the consent of
[defendant] by failing to timely record a continuation UCC-1, this damaged
[defendant] by exposing it to greater liability for payment of the note, and
discharged [defendant] from its obligation to pay the note to the extent of the
value of the machinery at the time it was lost as collateral.
Id. at 396, 577 S.E.2d at 2.
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In Columbus-Muscogee County Consolidated Government v. CM Tax
Equalization, Inc.,254 the supreme court appraised the validity of a
local constitutional amendment. 5 freezing the county ad valorem tax
value of homestead property in the county to its fair market value as of
1983.286 As for plaintiffs' contention that the provision violated the
constitution's tax uniformity command," 7 the court reviewed the
uniqueness of a local constitutional amendment 8 and held it a valid
"subsequent amendment to the uniformity clause." 2 9

The court

likewise rejected challengers' equal protection attack, noting that the
provision "must meet only the rational relationship test."2 ' Because
it "'was enacted precisely to achieve the benefits of an acquisition-value
system,'" 291 the freeze provision was invalid neither "because of the
classifications it draws among homeowners based upon purchase-date
classification,, 292 nor "because of the separate classification of home-

owners and renters."29 3 Finally, the court also upheld the provision
against a "right to travel" challenge.29 4 "Nothing in the Homestead
Freeze [local constitutional amendment] treats new arrivals to the
County any differently from long-term County residents seeking to

284.

276 Ga. 332, 579 S.E.2d 200 (2003).

285. 1981 Ga. Laws 1926-27.
286. 276 Ga. at 332, 579 S.E.2d at 201. The provision specified that
"homestead property in [the county] shall be valued for purposes of ad valorem
taxation for school and city-county government purposes based upon the fair
market value of the property as of January 1, 1983; or as of January 1 of the first
year when homestead exemption is allowed and claimed after January 1, 1983; or
as of January 1 of the year following the last change of ownership after January
1, 1983, whichever is later."
Id. (quoting 1981 Ga. Laws 1926-27).
287. GA. CONST. art. VII, § 1, para. 3.
288. 276 Ga. at 333, 579 S.E.2d at 202. This provision, the court explained, had been
adopted under the Georgia Constitution of 1976 (which permitted such measures), had
been properly ratified by the county voters, and had subsequently been validly saved as
permitted by the Georgia Constitution of 1983. Id. at 333, 579 S.E.2d at 201-02. That
constitution "specifically provides that those pre-existing LCAs that were not repealed...
'shall be continued in force and effect as a part of this Constitution.'" Id. (quoting GA.
CONST. art. XI, § 1, para. 4(b)).
289. Id. at 334, 579 S.E.2d at 202.
290. Id.

291. Id. at 336, 579 S.E.2d at 203 (quoting Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 16 (1992)).
292. Id.
293.

Id.

294. Id. at 338, 579 S.E.2d at 205.
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purchase a home there."29 296
Accordingly, the court reversed the trial
judge's decision of invalidity.
F

Liability
County liability may arise in a variety of contexts.

Adams

297

Dorsey v.

featured the county's liability for contempt of court, specifi-

cally the county's failure to comply with a settlement agreement to
provide medical care for inmates at the county jail.298 In defense, the
county contended that its only obligation was to allocate funds to the
sheriff, not to monitor the care provided. 299 That argument, said the
court of appeals, "ignores the settlement agreement that [the county]
entered into and the court order requiring the county to abide by the
agreement."0 ° The county attorney had signed the agreement as the
county's "authorized representative," the court emphasized, and the
county must fund and monitor medical care in accordance with the
settlement terms.3 0 '
Most county liability litigation sounded in tort, thereby implicating the
doctrine of county tort immunity.30 2 A county may waive its immunity,
to the extent of liability insurance, for claims "arising by reason of
ownership, maintenance, operation, or use of any motor vehicle." 3
Unsuccessfully invoking that waiver, plaintiff in Anderson v. Barrow
County304 sought recovery for the death of his wife who was struck by

295. Id.
296. Id.
297. 255 Ga. App. 257, 564 S.E.2d 847 (2002).
298. Id. at 257, 564 S.E.2d at 848. The trial judge had found the county to have
wilfully disobeyed the agreement and declared the county in contempt. Id.
299. Id. at 259, 564 S.E.2d at 849-50. "[B]ecause it has allocated money to the sheriff
to provide inmate medical care, the county reasons that it has met its obligation and
cannot be held in contempt for failing to perform duties that fall exclusively to the sheriff."
Id.
300. Id., 564 S.E.2d at 850.
301. Id. "Contrary to [the county's] argument, the court's finding that the county is in
contempt is not somehow based on the sheriffs statutory duty to maintain the jail, but is
properly based on the county's own violations of the terms of the settlement agreement,
which had been adopted by the court." Id. The court thus affirmed the trial judge's
declaration of county contempt. Id. at 260, 564 S.E.2d at 830.
302. For perspective on county tort immunity, see R. Perry Sentell, Jr., Georgia Local
Government Tort Liability: The "Crisis"Conundrum, 2 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 19 (1985); R.
Perry Sentell, Jr., Local Government Tort Liability: The Summer of '92, 9 GA. ST. U. L.
REV. 405 (1993).
303. O.C.G.A. § 33-24-51 (1996 & Supp. 2002). For treatment of the statute and its
history, see R. Perry Sentell, Jr., Tort Liability Insurance in Georgia Local Government
Law, 24 MERCER L. REv. 651 (1973).
304. 256 Ga. App. 160, 568 S.E.2d 68 (2002).
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a county emergency vehicle. °3 Specifically, plaintiff claimed that his
wife's death resulted from the county's failure to enforce its safe driving
policy.3

6

Even so, the court reasoned, the jury had found that dece-

dent's "own act of turning into the path of the emergency vehicle was the
proximate cause of her death."30 7 Consequently, "there is simply no
causal connection between the accident and any alleged violation of [the
county's safe driving] policy."308 As for insurance waiver, the court was
unyielding: "Even if the county'c safe driving policy was violated, that
violation did not arise 'by reason of ownership, maintenance, operation,
or use of any motor
vehicle,' but rather by failure to enforce the safe
30 9
driving policy."
Most of the survey period's tort litigation sought to impose personal
liability upon the county officer, agent, or employee allegedly responsible
for plaintiff's injury.31° When the claim is directed to the officer's
individual capacity, the concept of "official immunity" excludes liability
for "discretionary functions" performed without malice or intent to
injure.31 ' Only for "ministerial functions" is the officer responsible in
negligence.3 12 In Anderson the plaintiffs action for his wife who was
struck by an emergency vehicle provided apt illustration of the
exercise.313 There, the court of appeals reviewed plaintiff's charges of
the driver's negligence but concluded that the decision to rush to the
scene of an emergency lay within the officer's discretion.1 4 Minus

305. PlaintifFs decedent "was killed... when she pulled into the path of a... [c]ounty
rescue vehicle driven by ... a captain and volunteer firefighter who was responding to a
two-car head-on collision." Id. at 160, 568 S.E.2d at 69.
306. Id.
307. Id. at 162, 568 S.E.2d at 71.
308. Id. at 163, 568 S.E.2d at 71.
309. Id., 568 S.E.2d at 72.
310. For treatment of the personal liability of local government officers or employees,
see R. Perry Sentell, Jr., Georgia Local Government Officers: Rights for Their Wrongs, 13
GA. L. REV. 747 (1979); R. Perry Sentell, Jr., Individual Liability in Georgia Local
Government Law: The Haunting Hiatus of Hennessy, 40 MERCER L. REV. 27 (1988); R.
Perry Sentell, Jr., Local Government Tort Liability: The Summer of '92, 9 GA. ST. U. L.
REV. 405 (1993).
311. Anderson, 256 Ga. App. at 163, 568 S.E.2d at 72.
312. Id.
313. Id. at 160, 568 S.E.2d at 69. PlaintifFs wife "was killed.., when she pulled into
the path of a ... [clounty rescue vehicle being driven by ... a volunteer firefighter ...
responding to a two-car, head-on collision." Id. Thus, the court asserted, "if the damages
complained of arise from discretionary actions, [defendant] has official immunity; if, on the
other hand, the damages arise from the performance or nonperformance of ministerial
duties, [defendant] does not have official immunity." Id. at 161, 568 S.E.2d at 70.
314. Id. at 161-62,568 S.E.2d at 70-71 (citing Logue v. Wright, 260 Ga. 206,392 S.E.2d
235 (1990), which involved a police officer responding to an emergency). The court found
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allegations of malice or intent, therefore,3 15 "[the officer] is protected
316
by official immunity and was entitled to summary judgment."
31 7
The court employed a similar analysis in both Anderson v. Cobb
and Aliffi v. Liberty County School District.1 5 Anderson featured an
action for false arrest and malicious prosecution against a county
detective for plaintiff's being charged with a battery.319 On grounds
that "[t]he decision to seek an arrest warrant is a discretionary act,"32 °
the court promptly invoked the doctrine of official immunity which,
absent evidence of "a deliberate intent to [do wrong],"3 2' required
judgment for the detective.3 22 Similarly, the court in Aliffi affirmed
summary judgment for a county school teacher who was sued for the
death of a student in the school's storage garage.3 23 The teacher's
monitoring and supervising children in her classroom constituted an
exercise of her "discretionary authority,"3 24 and there was no evidence
of malice or intent to injure.325
On occasion, plaintiff may concede the officer's discretionary function
but rely upon the charge of "actual malice." Tittle v. Corso3 21 presented
such an instance regarding plaintiff's allegations of a deputy sheriffs

"this reasoning to be equally applicable to a volunteer firefighter who has exercised his
discretion in rushing to the scene of an accident." Id. at 162, 568 S.E.2d at 70.
315. "[T]here is no allegation of malice or intent to injure." Id. at 162, 568 S.E.2d at
71.
316. Id.
317. 258 Ga. App. 159, 573 S.E.2d 417 (2002).
318. 259 Ga. App. 713, 578 S.E.2d 146 (2003).
319. 258 Ga. App. at 159, 573 S.E.2d at 418. After being acquitted on the battery
charge, plaintiff sued the detective and other county employees both individually and in
their official capacities. The "official capacity" actions were denied on grounds of sovereign
immunity. Id.
320. Id. at 160, 573 S.E.2d at 419.
321. Id. "[Plaintiffl must show that [defendant] acted with the deliberate intent to
commit a wrongful act or with the deliberate intent to harm her." Id.
322. Id.
Even assuming plaintiffs charges of incomplete investigation and poor
interviewing procedures, the court held that those actions were insufficient to show the
necessary "deliberate intent." Id. The court affirmed summary judgment for defendant.
Id. at 161, 573 S.E.2d at 419.
323. 259 Ga. App. at 713, 578 S.E.2d at 146. Defendant sent the ten-year-old child to
get paper from a large roll in the school storage garage, and the roll fell onto the child and
killed her. Plaintiffs sued, alleging that defendant violated written school board policy in
sending the unsupervised child to the garage. Id. at 713-14, 578 S.E.2d at 147.
324. Id. at 716, 578 S.E.2d at 148.
325. Id. "Accordingly, the court's grant of summary judgment on the claims against
[defendant] in her individual capacity on the basis of official immunity was proper." Id.,
578 S.E.2d at 148-49.
326. 256 Ga. App. 859, 569 S.E.2d 873 (2002).
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profanity, threats, and physical force during a nighttime investigation.3 27 By virtue of a four-to-three division, the court of appeals found
that defendant's conduct was insufficiently abusive: Although disapproving the deputy's actions, "we cannot conclude that [defendant's]
profanity, threats, and 'slamming' showed a deliberate intent to commit
a wrongful act . ... ,,2's For the dissenters, contrarily, plaintiff's
charges of "actual malice" warranted a jury trial.329
Allegations sufficient to raise a jury issue appeared in Bateast v.
DeKalb County,3 0 a malicious prosecution action against a county
police officer who charged plaintiff with giving a false name and date of
birth.33 ' Under plaintiff's version of the facts, 3 2 said the court, she
provided the officer "with documents clearly showing her name and date
of birth prior to the time [defendant] decided to arrest her."333 From
those facts, a jury might reasonably infer that defendant proceeded to
arrest plaintiff, knowing of her innocence and "thereby deliberately
334
intending to do a wrongful act."
As noted, should plaintiff's harm result from "ministerial functions,"335 official immunity does not protect the officer from negligence
liability. 36 On occasion, the court may be called to crucially delineate
between functions performed by the same officer in a single case. In
37
Happoldt v. Kutscher,"
for example, plaintiffs sued a county subdivision review officer for negligence in failing to ensure a road's compliance

327. Id. at 861, 569 S.E.2d at 876. Defendant, an off-duty deputy sheriff, heard loud
noises at night near his home and responded to a "shots fired" call when he encountered
plaintiffs stopped vehicle and proceeded to investigate in a manner which prompted
plaintiffs action "alleging a variety of torts." Id. at 859-60, 569 S.E.2d at 875.
328. Id. at 863, 569 S.E.2d at 877. "Although we in no way condone [defendant's]
behavior, as described by [plaintiff], we must conclude that, as a matter of law, it does not
rise to the level of actual malice." Id. at 862, 569 S.E.2d at 877.
329. Id. at 865, 569 S.E.2d at 879 (Mikell, J., dissenting) "In the case at bar, the
evidence, when construed most favorably to [plaintiff], permits an inference that
[defendant] acted with malice." Id.
330. 258 Ga. App. 131, 572 S.E.2d 756 (2002).
331. Id. at 131, 572 S.E.2d at 756-57. In a subsequent bench trial, plaintiff was found
not guilty. Id. at 132, 572 S.E.2d at 757.
332. In reviewing the grant of a summary judgment against plaintiff, the court
emphasized, it must accept her version of the facts. Id. at 132, 572 S.E.2d at 758.
333. Id. There was no question that the officer was engaged in a discretionary
function. Id.
334. Id. The court thus reversed the trial judge's grant of summary judgment for the
police officer. Id. at 133, 572 S.E.2d at 758.
335. Id. at 132, 572 S.E.2d at 757.
336. Id.
337. 256 Ga. App. 96, 567 S.E.2d 380 (2002).
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with a county ordinance. 3 8 On the one hand, the ordinance required
that the officer exercise his personal judgment in insuring "adequate
drainage," a "determination [that] was discretionary in nature."3"9 In
contrast, the ordinance also specified precise grading requirements for
different types of streets: "These instructions," the court asserted, "are
sufficiently clear and definite as to call for exercise of a ministerial duty
"340

Somewhat similarly, the court in Clark v. Prison Health Services,
Inc. 41 analyzed an array of functions performed by different officers
in the case.342 There, plaintiff sued for her son's suicide while a
prisoner in the county jail, naming various jail officers in their individual capacities.343 In denying these officers the protection of official
immunity, the court proceeded to isolate their respective "ministerial
duties." 3"
The classification officer, the court found, performed
documentation work "governed by clear, definite, and certain procedures
or instructions."3 45 The booking sergeant worked under policies so
definite "'as merely to require the execution of a relatively simple,
specific duty.'" 346 The mental health counselor's failure to implement
referral procedures after receiving telephone messages "constituted a
ministerial act."347 Finally, two floor officers held duties of cell

338. Id. at 96, 567 S.E.2d at 381. Plaintiffs sued for personal injuries and death arising
from an automobile collision at an intersection of a subdivision road and a county road.
Plaintiffs alleged that defendant's failure to comply with county road construction
standards in respect to the subdivision road caused the county road to wash out and result
in the collision. Plaintiffs charged that defendant "breached ministerial duties imposed on
him by the ... County Subdivision Ordinance and Road Standards." Id. at 97, 567 S.E.2d
at 381.
339. Id. at 99-100, 567 S.E.2d at 383. Thus, official immunity protected defendant
against liability for his negligence in this respect. Id. at 100, 567 S.E.2d at 383.
340. Id. at 100, 567 S.E.2d at 383. For the officer's negligence in this respect, therefore,
official immunity was not available. Id., 567 S.E.2d at 384. However, the court concluded,
there still could be no liability because plaintiffs presented no evidence that "the accident
resulted from [defendant's] alleged failure to ensure that the subdivision road complied
with the grading requirements in the county ordinance." Id.
341. 257 Ga. App. 787, 572 S.E.2d 342 (2002).
342. Id. at 790-91, 572 S.E.2d at 346.
343. Id. at 788, 572 S.E.2d at 345. Plaintiffs decedent was arrested for driving a stolen
car into the county and committed suicide by hanging himself in his cell some five days
later. Id. at 787, 572 S.E.2d at 344.
344. Id. at 788, 572 S.E.2d 347.
345. Id. at 792, 572 S.E.2d at 348.
346. Id. (quoting Happoldt, 256 Ga. at 98, 567 S.E.2d at 382). These were applicable
jail policies regarding handling of mental health referrals. Id.
347. Id. at 794, 572 S.E.2d at 348. Established policies required a mental health
assessment upon receiving a communication from a family member suggesting the prisoner
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inspection and location documentation which required no "exercise of
personal judgment."34 s Accordingly, the court denied all these officers
the summary judgment benefit of official immunity. 49
A plaintiff may sue the county officer in his "official" rather than
"individual" capacity."' 0
The distinction is an important one, as
evidenced by the court of appeals decision in Soley v. Dodson.3 5'
There, plaintiff first sued a deputy sheriff individually for injuries
resulting from a high-speed chase.3 52 Two months after expiration of
the statute of limitations, plaintiff dismissed her action and immediately
refiled a suit against the sheriff in both his individual and official
capacities. 53 On review, the court conceded the renewal statute to
permit plaintiff to refile the action within six months of dismissal.5 4
To suspend the statute of limitations, however, "[t]here must ... be a
substantial identity of essential parties."355 Because "[the sheriff] in
his individual capacity is not substantially identical to [the sheriff] in his
capacity as deputy sheriff,"3 56 the court held plaintiff's official capacity
action barred by the statute of limitations. 7
G.

Zoning

A county's zoning procedures may be impacted by a variety of other
3
county developments. The procedure at issue in Rock v. Head 11

might harm himself. Id.
348. Id. These policies concerned inspecting and monitoring inmates. Id.
349. Id.
350. Id. at 791, 572 S.E.2d at 346.
351. 256 Ga. App. 770, 569 S.E.2d 870 (2002). See also Ward v. Dodson, 256 Ga. App.
660, 569 S.E.2d 554 (2002).
352. The sheriff was pursuing a fleeing motorist and struck the back of the car in which
plaintiff was a passenger. 256 Ga. App. at 770, 569 S.E.2d at 871.
353. Id. at 771, 569 S.E.2d at 872.
354. Id.; O.C.G.A. § 9-2-61 (1982 & Supp. 2002).
355. 256 Ga. App. at 772, 569 S.E.2d at 872 (citing Sheldon & Co. v. Emory Univ., 184
Ga. 440, 191 S.E. 497 (1937)).
356. Id., 569 S.E.2d at 873. "[W]hile a suit against [the sheriff] in his individual
capacity seeks a recovery from [the sheriff], a suit against [the sheriff] in his capacity as
deputy sheriff seeks a recovery from the employing county: 'Suits against public employees
in their official capacities are in reality suits against the state and, therefore, involve
sovereign immunity.'" Id. (quoting Cameron v. Lang, 274 Ga. 122, 126, 549 S.E.2d 341,
347 (2001)).
357. Id. at 773, 569 S.E.2d at 873. -'[T]he renewal statute may not be used to suspend
the running of the statute of limitation as to defendants different from those originally
sued.' Accordingly, [plaintiffs] action against [the sheriff] in his capacity as deputy sheriff
is barred by the statute of limitation." Id. (quoting Wagner v. Casey, 169 Ga. App. 500,
501, 313 S.E.2d 756, 758 (1984)).
358. 254 Ga. App. 382, 562 S.E.2d 768 (2002).
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prohibited approval of a zoning measure that did not receive the vote of
the county commissioner representing the district in which the land was
located or the vote of one of the then two at-large commissioners. 59
Subsequently, the two at-large commissioners were replaced by two
commissioners elected from separate county "superdistricts." 360 The
case in controversy featured a rezoning measure which received the
votes of a majority of the commissioners, including the vote of the
superdistrict commissioner whose superdistrict did not contain the
subject land."' However, the commissioner representing the district
in which the land was located, as well as the superdistrict commissioner
representing that district, both voted against the measure. 6 2 In these
circumstances, the court of appeals concluded, the rezoning measure did
not receive valid approval."s
The change from at-large commissioners
to superdistrict commissioners did not simply substitute the latter for
the former," the court reasoned, but rather eliminated at-large county
representation.3 65 Accordingly, the favorable vote of the superdistrict
commissioner from the district not containing the subject land did not
meet the zoning law's requirement. 66 Rather, the court held, "no
zoning changes can be approved without the vote of a commissioner in
whose district the property is located "3 6 -- either the district representative or the superdistrict representative.3 6

359. Id. at 382, 562 S.E.2d at 769; 1981 Ga. Laws 4304, 4311.
360. 254 Ga. App. at 383-84, 562 S.E.2d at 769. 1992 Ga. Laws 6567, 6572-6575. This
statute did not expressly amend or repeal the 1981 statute. 254 Ga. App. at 383-84, 562
S.E.2d at 769.
361. The commissioners voted four-to-three in favor of the measure rezoning the
property from residential to office use. Plaintiff property owners, relying upon the 1981
statutory zoning requirement, questioned the validity of the rezoning measure. 254 Ga.
App. at 384, 562 S.E.2d at 770.
362. Id.
363. Id. at 382, 562 S.E.2d at 769. "[Wle conclude that the trial court correctly found
that the board's vote did not constitute an approval of [the property owner's] application
for rezoning." Id.
364. Id. at 384-85, 562 S.E.2d at 770. "[The property owner] urges us to conclude that
the 1992 Act 'simply substitutes Super District Commissioners for At Large Commissioners.'... We do not agree." Id.
365. Id. at 385, 562 S.E.2d at 771. "The 1992 Act eliminated at-large commissioners
and divided the county into two geographically distinct superdistricts, and one commissioner must be chosen from each." Id.
366. Id.
367. Id.
368. Id. Thus, the court affirmed the trial judge's summary judgment against the
property owner even though the rezoning measure had received a four-to-three vote of the
commissioners. Id. at 387, 562 S.E.2d at 772.
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The court's perceived relationship between zoning and planning
3 69
controlled its disposition of Kingsley v. FloridaRock Industries, Inc.
That case presented a challenge to the validity of the county's comprehensive plan because it was not adopted pursuant to zoning requirements.3 7 0 Rejecting the challenge, the court distinguished the two
functions. 371 As for zoning, the constitution3 72 authorizes legislative
enactment of the Zoning Procedures Law, 7 3 which requires notice
some fifteen days prior to county action. 374 As for planning, the
constitution 37 5 authorizes legislative creation of the Georgia Department of Community Affairs ("DCA) 376 which requires such notice as
counties "normally use."377 Because the zoning requirement does not
control the planning function,378 the county acted properly in adopting
its comprehensive plan by providing such notice as it "'normally use[d]"' 379 for public hearings.

369. 259 Ga. App. 207, 576 S.E.2d 569 (2002).
370. Id. at 207, 576 S.E.2d at 570. The immediate issue in the case was the county's
denial of plaintiffs rezoning request on grounds that it did not comply with the county's
comprehensive use plan. Plaintiff then challenged the validity of the comprehensive plan,
on grounds that the county had adopted it by giving notice by publication some fourteen
days prior to the hearing, instead of following a fifteen-day notice requirement contained
in both the Zoning Procedures Law and an identical county zoning ordinance. Uncontradicted testimony established that notice by publication constituted the county's ordinary
procedure on nonzoning matters. Id., 576 S.E.2d at 570-71.
371. Id. at 210, 576 S.E.2d at 573. "[T]he planning process is separate and distinct
from the zoning process and the two are fundamentally different." Id. Planning, the court
said, is of a broader scope than zoning and "does not ordinarily impose any immediate
restrictions upon land use .... " Id. at 211, 576 S.E.2d at 573. Contrarily, "[zoning...
is one of the means by which the comprehensive plan is carried out, and it is subject to
constitutional demands of due process and equal protection and the constitutional
prohibition against taking private property without just compensation." Id.
372. GA. CONST. art. IX, § 2, para. 4.
373. O.C.G.A. §§ 36-66-1 to -5 (2000 & Supp. 2002).
374. Id. § 36-66-4(a). Additionally, "the [county zoning ordinance] mimics the state law
requirement" of fifteen-days notice. 259 Ga. App. at 209, 576 S.E.2d at 572.
375. GA. CONST. art. IX, § 2, para. 4.
376. O.C.G.A. § 50-8-3(a) (2002).
377. GA. CoMP. R. AND REGS. 110-3-2-.06(4)(a): 'Local governments should follow the
public hearing notifications procedures they normally use in announcing and conducting
public hearings." Id.
378. "Given these important distinctions between planning and zoning, we cannot agree
that [the county zoning ordinance] somehow converts the [county] planning process into
something akin to zoning, such that the stricter procedures applicable to zoning apply."
259 Ga. App. at 211, 576 S.E.2d at 573.
379. Id. at 209, 576 S.E.2d at 572 (quoting GA. CoMP. R. AND REGS. 110-3-2-.06(4)(a)).
380. Id. The court thus reversed the trial judge's decision invalidating the county's
denial of plaintiffs rezoning application. Id. at 212, 576 S.E.2d at 572.
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Turtle Cove Property Owners Ass'n v. Jasper County3 8' featured yet
another issue of relationship-the relation between zoning and
restrictive covenants.3 82 By virtue of general statute, the county's
adoption of a zoning ordinance limits existing subdivision covenants to
a period of twenty additional years. 83 Consequently, the court held,
forty-five-year covenants imposed in 1971 automatically expired in 1995,
i.e., twenty years after adoption of the 1975 county zoning ordinance. 3 84
Additionally, the general statute's automatic renewal
provision 85 does not apply to covenants recorded prior to 1993.386
Nevertheless, the declaration of covenants itself effected the covenants'
automatic renewal for fifteen-year terms,387 the court held, and that
provision validly renewed the covenants for fifteen years following their
1995 expiration.8 8
III.

LEGISLATION

The Georgia General Assembly's 2003 regular session set a record for
its length; the session also yielded a number of enactments dealing with
local governments. A few of the more significant measures might simply
be noted.
Initially, the legislature addressed openness in government via at least
two provisions. One of those measures exempts from the "open records"
requirement the identity of a person placing an emergency "911"

381. 255 Ga. App. 560, 566 S.E.2d 368 (2002).
382. The immediate issue in the case concerned the right of subdivision property
owners to county property tax refunds on subdivision common property encumbered by
restrictive covenants and thus having no taxable value. Id. at 560, 566 S.E.2d at 368. For
treatment of the zoning-covenant relationship, see R. Perry Sentell, Jr., Restrictive
Covenants and Zoning: A Dynamic Duo, 30 URBAN GA. MAG. 15 (Sept. 1980).
383. Id. at 561, 566 S.E.2d at 369; O.C.G.A. § 44-5-60(b) (1991 & Supp. 2002).
384. 255 Ga. App. at 561, 566 S.E.2d at 369. "[T]he initial term of the ... covenants
expired in 1995." Id.
385. O.C.G.A. § 44-5-60(d) (2001).
386. Id. 'Because the... covenants were recorded before 1993, the automatic renewal
provided by [the general statute] does not apply to them." 255 Ga. App. at 561, 566 S.E.2d
at 369.
387. 255 Ga. App. at 561, 566 S.E.2d at 369. "This case therefore turns on whether the
covenants were renewed after their 1995 expiration pursuant to the automatic [fifteen]year renewal provision set forth in the declaration of covenants." Id. Said the court:
'There is nothing in the governing [general] statute ... which prohibits the automatic
renewal of covenants." Id. at 562, 566 S.E.2d at 369.
388. Id. at 562, 566 S.E.2d at 369. The court thus reversed the trial judge's decision
that the covenants did not renew. Id.
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The second measure operates to exempt from that

same requirement any public record compromising security against
sabotage or terrorism. 390 This second enactment additionally exempts
from the "open meetings" mandate any meeting at which those security
compromising records are discussed. 1
Among statutes affecting local government officers and employees, one
measure expands disability compensation programs to include volunteer
firefighters. 92 A second enactment relates to expenses incurred by a
local government for the training of its peace officers.393 That government may obtain reimbursement for those expenses from another local
government which hires the officer within fifteen months of the training
program. 3" The statute requires the local government demanding
reimbursement to submit an itemized sworn statement and to make
demand for payment.3 9
Finally, all local governments must, by
January 1, 2004, adopt written policies setting forth the manner in
which emergency response and vehicle pursuits are to be conducted.396
The local government's power to zone property suffered encumbrance
from a statute focusing upon military establishments.3 97 The measure
requires the local government to notify the commander of any military
base or installation in respect
to any change in zoning within three
398

thousand feet of the facility.

New legislation on local government authorities includes a statute
impacting development authorities in two respects.3 99 First, the
enactment permits development authorities to operate sports facilities
and amphitheaters. 40 Second, the measure authorizes the creation of

389. Ga. H.R.B. 246, Reg. Sess. (2003). There is an exception if the request for the
records is made by the accused in a criminal case. Id.
390. Ga. S.B. 113, Reg. Sess. (2003). This would include vulnerability assessments,
building blueprints, and other security-related records. Id.
391. Id.
392. Ga. H.R.B, 166, Reg. Sess. (2003). Full time law enforcement officers and
firefighters were already included. Id.
393. Ga. S.B. 215, Reg. Sess. (2003).
394. Id. If the officer is hired by another government within fifteen to twenty-four
months of the training program, the hiring government must reimburse the other
government by one-half the total expenses. Id.
395. Id. The demanding government must document the peace officer's acknowledgment of this statute prior to his or her employment. Id.
396. Ga. S.B. 292, Reg. Sess. (2003). Non-complying local governments may not receive
state funding or state administered federal funding. Id.
397. Ga. S.B. 261, Reg. Sess. (2003).
398. Id.
399. Ga. H.R.B. 309, Reg. Sess. (2003).
400. Id. The facility must host regional, statewide, or national events. Id.
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a joint development authority by a Georgia county and the contiguous
county of an adjoining state. °1 Yet another statute, the "War on
Terrorism Local Assistance Act,"40 2 creates a "public safety and judicial
facilities authority"4 3 for each local government in the state.40 4 The
authority is activated by the local government's adoption of an ordinance
or resolution and is empowered to construct judicial, public safety, and
detention facilities.4 5
In the regulatory realm, the 2003 General Assembly adopted measures
affecting local governments in a variety of contexts. One such enactment
unequivocally prohibits any local government from performing inspections or investigations of residential rental property to ensure compliance with building and safety codes.40 6 In the environmental sphere,
new legislation requires local governments to adopt an ordinance
governing land-disturbing activities and to meet state permitting
standards for monitoring, reporting, and inspecting. 4 7 The local
government's appropriate employees must take seminars and pass an
examination for certification as erosion and sedimentation control
regulators. 40 8 An additional measure requires that ordinances regulating land-disturbing activities and development must apply to property
owned by the local government promulgating the ordinance.4 9
Finally, the General Assembly amended the statute providing for the
fees paid by the Department of Motor Vehicle Safety to local governments that file their traffic citations electronically.40 The amendment
increases the fee from twenty-five cents to forty cents (while decreasing
fees from twenty-five cents
to ten cents for local governments that file
41
citations by U.S. mail). '

IV.

CONCLUSION

Although the cost of legal knowledge may be great, losses incurred
from the lack of such knowledge are greater still. In local government

401. Id.
402. Ga. S.B. 87, Reg. Sess. (2003).
403. Id.
404. Id. The authority is managed by an appointed board of directors. Id.
405. Id.
406. Ga. H.R.B. 748, Reg. Sess. (2003). The statute also amends the enterprise zone
law to add retail and day care as businesses eligible for tax credit. Id.
407. Ga. H.R.B. 285, Reg. Sess. (2003).
408. Id. The statute is to increase the ability of the State Environmental Protection
Division to review erosion and sedimentation control plans. Id.
409. Ga. H.R.B. 509, Reg. Sess. (2003).
410. O.C.G.A. § 40-5-53 (2001).
411. Ga. S.B. 229, Reg. Sess. (2003).
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law, it appears, a call to the attorney may on occasion constitute a wise
investment.

